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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Supreme Court had original appellate jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j), and transferred it to this Court pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). Jurisdiction in this Court is pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2)G) by transfer from the Supreme Court. (R. 1632.) 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This appeal presents the following issues for this Court: 
(a) Whether the trial court erred in denying Highland Estates' motion for 
directed verdict on the issue of standing under Rule 23.1 at the close of Plaintiffs' case 
where the LeVangers presented no evidence on this issue to the trial court and where the 
issues of standing had not been waived or previously decided. 
(b) Whether the trial court erred in denying Highland Estates' motion for 
directed verdict on the issue of substantial benefit at the close of Plaintiffs' case where 
the LeVangers presented no evidence on this issue to the trial court. 
Standard of Review: When a party challenges atrial court's denial of a 
motion for directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the basis of 
insufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court will reverse where, viewing the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, the court concludes that the evidence is 
insufficient to support the verdict. See Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 2001 
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UT 77; 31 P.3d 557 (Utah 2001); Heslop v. Bankof Utah. 839 P.2d 828, 839 (Utah 
1992); see also Scudder v. Kennecott Copper Corp.. 886 P.2d 48, 52 (Utah 1994). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUES AT THE TRIAL COURT 
The issue of Plaintiffs' lack of standing under Rule 23.1 was first raised as a 
defense in Defendant's Answer. (R. 0074.) The Plaintiffs' lack of standing was 
presented to the trial court in a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Highland Estates, 
which was denied. (R. 208-215.) The standing and substantial benefit issues were 
brought before the trial court in Highland Estates' Motion for Evidentiary Hearing and 
again in Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment filed after the first appeal of this case. (R. 1269-1271, 1311-12, 1384-89, 1430-
1433.) 
On June 26, 2001, the trial court held a hearing regarding Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Summary Judgment and Defendant's Motion for Evidentiary Hearing. Defendant 
informed the trial court that the issues of standing under Rule 23.1 and substantial benefit, 
among other issues, would need to be addressed at an evidentiary hearing. (R. 1634, p. 
3.) The trial court granted Defendant's Motion for Evidentiary Hearing and scheduled a 
trial. (R. 1445.) 
On September 19, 2001, a trial was held where Defendant again presented the 
issues of standing under Rule 23.1 and substantial benefit. (R. 1634, p. 15.) The trial 
court requested that the parties submit written closing arguments. (R. 1634, p. 148.) 
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Defendant again set forth the issues of standing and substantial benefit in its Written 
Closing Argument. (R. 1511-1526.) At no time did the Plaintiffs present any evidence 
regarding the issue of standing or substantial benefit. 
The trial court entered findings from the evidentiary hearing on December 16, 
2001. (R. 1555.) Defendant filed its timely Notice of Appeal on Januaiy 7, 2002. (R. 
1567-68.) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRO VISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 23.1 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is determinative of this appeal. 
This Rule provides in full: 
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or 
members to enforce a right of a corporation or of an unincorporated 
association, the corporation or association having failed to enforce 
a right which may properly be asserted by it, the complaint shall be 
verified and shall allege (1) that the plaintiff was a shareholder or 
member at the time of the transaction of which he complains or that 
his share or membership thereafter devolved on him by operation of 
law, and (2) that the action is not a collusive one to confer 
jurisdiction on a court of the United States which it would not 
otherwise have. The complaint shall also allege with particularity 
the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he 
desires from the directors or comparable authority and, if necessary, 
from the shareholders or members, and the reasons for his failure to 
obtain the action or for not making the effort. The derivative action 
may not be maintained if it appears that the plaintiff does not fairly 
and adequately represent the interests of the shareholders or 
members similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation 
or association. The action shall not be dismissed or compromised 
without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed 
dismissal or compromise shall be given to shareholders or members 
in such manner as the court directs. 
UtahR. Civ. P. 23.1. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This is an action brought by Jean and Rebecca LeVanger, as a purported 
derivative action under Rule 23.1, against Highland Estates Properties Owners 
Association, Inc. ("Highland Estates"), and members of its former board of trustees, 
alleging that the manner in which the Association's amended CC&R's were approved 
was improper and contrary to the Association's organizational documents and Utah law. 
(R. 001-009.) In addition, the LeVangers sought attorneys fees for conferring a 
substantial benefit on Highland Estates. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION. 
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint January 21, 1997. (R. 9.) Defendant Highland 
Estates filed its Answer February 26, 1997. (R. 77.) 
Highland Estates filed a Motion for Summary Judgment November 26, 1997. 
(R. 198.) The Motion was set for hearing before Judge Nehring on January 9, 1998. (R. 
411.) The Court issued an order granting in part Highland Estates partial summary 
judgment on May 28, 1998. (R. 467.) 
Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Reconsider the Decision Granting Partial Summary 
Judgment or to Certify the Order as Final and Appealable on July 16, 1998. (R. 479.) A 
hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider was held before Judge Brian, on October 7, 
1998. At the hearing, the Court denied Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider and granted 
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Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify the Summary Judgment as Final pursuant to Rule 54(b) and 
thereafter signed an Order to that on March 3, 1999. (R. 1063.) 
Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal on March 31, 1999 and appealed only the 
issue of the propriety of the mail-in ballot process. (R.1074.) The case was subsequently 
transferred to the Court of Appeals by Order dated May 18, 1999. (R. 1145.) This Court 
reversed the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Highland Estates and 
determined that the manner in which the members of Highland Estates had adopted the 
amended CC&R's did not conform with the pertinent operating documents and Utah 
Statutes. See Levanser v. Vincent. 2000 UT APP. 103; 3 P.3d 187 (Utah Ct. App. 2000). 
After this case was remanded to the trial court, the LeVangers moved for 
summary judgment on the issue of attorneys fees, claiming they were legally entitled to 
the same. (R. 1194-96.) Highland Estates moved the trial court to hold an evidentiary 
hearing on the factual issues relating to whether Plaintiffs were legally entitled to 
attorneys fees, including the issues of standing and substantial benefit. (R. 1269-71, 
1430-33.) Highland Estates opposed Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on the 
basis that: (1) the LeVangers had no standing to bring their claims as they did not fairly 
and adequately represent the association as required by Rule 23.1 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure; (2) that the LeVangers had not conferred a substantial benefit on 
Highland Estates that would entitle them to collect attorneys fees; and (3) that the claimed 
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fees were not reasonable.1 (R. 1311-12, 1384-89.) The trial of these issues was held on 
September 19, 2001. (R. 1555.) At the close of Plaintiffs' case, Defendant moved the 
court to enter a directed verdict as Plaintiffs had presented no evidence whatsoever 
regarding the issues of standing under Rule 23.1 or regarding substantial benefit. (R. 
1634, pp. 79-84.) The court took the motion under advisement. (Id.) 
Following the evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered a Ruling, dated 
November 27, 2001, and subsequently signed an Order, dated December 11, 2001 
granting the LeVangers $41,327.15 in attorneys fees and costs. (R. 1554-55.) Defendant 
timely filed its Notice of Appeal on January 7, 2002. (R. 1567-68.) Highland Estates 
appeals from this Order given that the LeVangers presented no evidence whatsoever that 
they had standing under Rule 23.1 or that they had conferred a substantial benefit on the 
association. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
1. Highland Estates is a homeowners association that consisted of 
approximately 260 members at the relevant time period. (R. 1089.) 
2. On July 6, 1964 the Restrictive Covenants of Highland Estates 
(hereinafter "1964 CC&R's") were recorded in Summit County. (R. 1316-19.) 
3. The 1964 CC&R's were amended on March 14, 1972. (R. 1321-
24.) 
1
 Highland Estates is not seeking appellate review of its arguments regarding the 
reasonableness of the attorneys fees as part of this appeal. 
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4. On October 30, 1972, the Articles of Incorporation of Highland 
Estates Properties Owners Association, Inc. were filed with the State of Utah, 
incorporating Highland Estates as a nonprofit corporation. (R. 1325-26.) 
5. In the late 1970fs, Highland Estates adopted a set of Bylaws (hereinafter 
"Original Bylaws"). The Original Bylaws gave the Association and the Board of Trustees 
the authority to make assessments and the ability to establish liens against the 
homeowners in the association. The Original Bylaws fully set forth the authority, purpose 
and basis of the Board of Trustees' power to assess and lien. (R. 1327-37.) 
6. The Original Bylaws also gave the Association the ability to amend 
the Bylaws by a majority vote at a regularly convened or specially convened Association 
meeting. (R. 1327-37.) 
7. In 1990 the 1972 CC&R's were again amended to create an 
architectural committee. (R. 1338-41.) 
8. Annual member meetings were attended by very few members. The 
lack of attendance made it impossible for the Board of Trustees to transact any business 
without holding a reconvened meeting. (R. 203.) 
9. The Board of Trustees, during 1993 and 1994, determined that the 1972 
CC&R's needed to be amended. (R. 304.) 
10. In the Spring of 1994, Highland Estate's General Counsel, Scott 
Welling, was asked by the Board of Trustees to draft an Amendment to Declarations and 
Restrictive and Protective Covenants ("Amended CC&R's"). A draft was presented to 
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the members in attendance at the Association's 1994 annual meeting held in June, 1994. 
Attorney Welling was present at the annual meeting and advised the members present of 
the legal aspects of the proposed changes. (R. 303-08.) There were not enough members 
present at the June 1994 meeting to constitute a quorum. (R. 262.) 
11. At the conclusion of the discussions, everyone present at the annual 
meeting voted to accept the Amended CC&R's and to allow until July 15, 1994 for 
comment by other homeowners. (R. 262.) 
12. It was suggested by Mr. Welling at the June 1994 meeting that the vote 
on the Amended CC&R's be undertaken by means of a written ballot, to be delivered to 
all members, along with a copy of the draft Amended CC&R's. (R. 262, 305.) 
13. At the suggestion of Mr. Welling, the trustees, and all members present 
at the 1994 annual meeting, agreed that the most effective and fair way to inform the 
greatest number of homeowners of the proposed changes to the 1972 CC&R's was by 
mail-in written ballot. (R. 305, 262.) 
14. Efforts to ensure as much input from the owners on the proposed 
amendment cost the Association several thousand dollars in attorney's fees and copy 
costs, let alone the time and effort of individual Board members and Officers that would 
not have been extended in submitting the Amended CC&R's to members at a reconvened 
meeting. (R. 305-06.) 
15. The Plaintiffs were not present at the June 1994 meeting. (R. 206.) 
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16. On August 23, 1994, Attorney Welling, on behalf of Highland Estates, 
prepared a letter to each member of Highland Estates stating that a copy of the proposed 
amendment to the 1972 CC&R's was attached to the letter and a ballot to officially 
register each member's vote of the proposed amendments to the CC&R's. (R. 306.) The 
letter indicated that the Amendment had the approval of the Board of Trustees and more 
than forty homeowners in attendance at the annual meeting in June, 1994. Attorney 
Welling explained the purpose of the Amendment and requested that ballots be returned 
no later than November 30, 1994. (R. 158, 305-07.) 
17. Mr. Welling's letter, along with a ballot and a voting draft of the 
Amended CC&R's was to be hand delivered to each of the members of Highland Estates. 
(R. 305.) In August 1994, Plaintiffs received by hand delivery the letter from Attorney 
Welling, a voting ballot and a draft of the Amended CC&R's. (R. 205, 233.) 
18. The Plaintiffs did not lodge an objection to the Amended CC&R's, nor 
did they vote on the CC&R's. In fact, Plaintiffs did nothing with respect to the CC&R's 
until the CC&R's had been ratified by a majority of the members of Highland Estates and 
had been recorded in the Summit County Recorder's Office. (R. 205, 233-34.) 
19. In January 1995, the Board of Trustees of Highland Estates sent a 
newsletter to each homeowner stating that the voting period for the Amended CC&R's 
had been extended and encouraged members who had not voted to do so. (R. 264.) 
20. The voting deadline of November 30, 1994, was never intended to be an 
automatic cut-off date for submission, merely an inducement to motivate homeowners to 
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act as soon as possible. (R. 306.) A majority of member owners voted in favor of the 
Amended CC&R's, the vote on the Amended CC&R's was 149 in favor, 26 opposed and 
87 who did not respond. (R. 306.) 
21. On September 28, 1995, Highland Estates held its annual homeowners 
meeting at 7:30 p.m. at the Burns Fire Station. The minutes of the annual meeting reflect 
that an announcement had been made that the Amended CC&R's had been approved by 
the majority of homeowners, that the ballots would be verified and upon completion, and 
that the Amended CC&R's would be recorded with the County. The sign-in sheet 
indicated that Plaintiffs were not present at the September 28, 1995 meeting. (R. 266-67.) 
22. On October 5, 1995, Highland Estates caused to be filed with the 
Summit County Recorder's Office, the Amended CC&R's. (R. 270-80.) The 
amendments had the effect of making the following changes: (1) allowing the Board of 
Trustees to amend the Bylaws without a vote by the Association; (2) allowing the 
Association's members to vote by mail-in ballot rather than at a convened meeting; and 
(3) incorporating into the CC&R's the assessment and lien authority already provided for 
under the Original Bylaws (hereinafter "1995 Amendments"). (R. 1342.) 
23. Since the enactment of the 1995 Amendments neither the Board of 
Trustees nor the Association has taken any action whatsoever under any provision of the 
1995 CC&R's. The 1995 Amendments have never been used in any manner by the 
Association. (R. 1354-59.) 
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24. All actions taken by the Association since the enactment of the 1995 
Amendments have been authorized under either the 1990 CC&R's or the Original 
Bylaws. (R. 1338, 1327, 1354-59.) 
25. The Association has caused liens to be recorded against various 
property owners which actions were authorized under the Original Bylaws. (R. 1327, 
1354-59.) 
26. The Board of Trustees has revised the Architectural Guidelines, 
which authority was provided for under the 1990 CC&R's and Original Bylaws. (R. 
1354-59.) 
27. Since the enactment of the 1995 Amendments, the Association has 
made the following amendments to its operating documents: 
(A) The CC&R's were amended in 1997 pursuant to the. 
regular meeting process as outlined in the Original Bylaws in order 
to add a provision regarding common areas and correct a 
typographical error regarding indemnification. This amendment 
was not enacted pursuant to any authority provided for in the 1995 
Amendments. (R. 1354-59.) 
(B) The CC&R's were again amended in 1999 pursuant to 
the regular meeting process as outlined in the Original Bylaws in 
order to add a provision regarding residential zones and to give the 
Board of Trustees the authority to amend the Bylaws without a vote 
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by the Association. This amendment was not enacted pursuant to 
any authority provided for in the 1995 Amendments. This 
amendment in part restored the changes that would have been in 
place had the LeVangers not brought their lawsuit. (R. 1354-59.) 
(C) The Original Bylaws were updated and clarified on or 
about November 29, 1999 pursuant to the regular meeting process 
as outlined in the Original Bylaws. This amendment was not 
enacted pursuant to any authority provided for in the 1995 
Amendments. (R. 1354-59.) 
(D) The Articles of Incorporation were updated and clarified 
in November of 1999 pursuant to the regular meeting process as 
outlined in the Original Bylaws. This amendment was not enacted 
pursuant to any authority provided for in the 1995 Amendments. 
(R. 1354-59.) 
27. The Plaintiffs, who are 20-year homeowners in the association, had 
failed to pay the $37 annual association assessments that had begun accruing since 1991. 
(R. 207, 285.) 
28. Given the Plaintiffs' failure to pay their assessments, the association 
filed a lawful lien against the LeVangers in an attempt to collect the monies due and 
owing. (R. 206.) 
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29. Plaintiffs then filed a purported derivative action pursuant to Rule 
23.1 against Highland Estates on January 21, 1997. (R. 9.) Plaintiffs5 Complaint sets 
forth causes of action for "Breach of Fiduciary Duty" and "Breach of Fiduciary Duty -
Gross Mismanagement" and seeks recision of the 1995 Amendments, attorneys fees and 
punitive damages. (R. 2-3, 5.) Plaintiffs contemporaneously filed a Motion for 
Temporary Restraining Order. (R. 60-62.) 
30. Defendant filed its Answer on February 26, 1997. (R. 77.) Defendant 
included the following defenses: 
SECOND DEFENSE 
The Verified Complaint fails to state a cause of action under Rule 
23.1 U.R.C.P. upon which relief may be granted, in that plaintiffs 
have failed identify [sic] any right which defendant Association has 
failed enforce [sic]. 
* * * 
1. In response to the allegations of paragraph 1, Defendant 
Association denies that plaintiffs have standing or qualification to 
bring such action under Rule 23.1 U.R.C.P. and denies that such 
action is brought in the right and for the benefit of Highland 
Estates. 
(R. 74.) 
31. It was not until September 26, 1997, that Plaintiffs noticed a hearing on 
their Temporary Restraining Order. (R. 165-166.) 
32. On September 30, 1997, Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining 
Order was heard by the trial court. Judge Brian denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary 
Restraining Order stating in a minute entry that the Plaintiffs had failed to meet their 
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burden under the rules. (R. 167.) In addition, Judge Brian scheduled a two-day bench 
trial for January 22 and 23, 1998 with a pre-trial conference set for January 14, 1998. (R. 
167.) 
33. Before the scheduled trial date, Highland Estates filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment which was fully briefed by both parties. The matter came on for oral 
argument at a hearing before Judge Nehring on January 9, 1998. The hearing was held 
two weeks before the scheduled trial of January 22 and 23. (R. 1084-1144.) 
34. From the bench, Judge Nehring granted partial summary judgment to 
Highland Estates, holding as a matter of law, that the Board of Trustees acted properly by 
accepting mail-in ballots to approve the 1995 Amendments. (R. 1130.) 
35. However, Judge Nehring declined to grant Defendant summary 
judgment on the issue of standing under Rule 23.1, finding that: 
Based upon the record before the Court, there are insufficient facts 
and insufficient grounds to, as a matter of law, determine that the 
plaintiffs are inappropriate parties to bring this action. 
(R. 1130, 1135, attached as Appendix A.) 
36. At the end of the hearing, Counsel for Plaintiff requested that the ruling 
on the issue of mail-in ballots be certified for interlocutory appeal. (R.l 136.) 
Throughout the remainder of the hearing, Plaintiffs' counsel continued to emphasize the 
fact that the ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment did not dispose of the entire 
case. (R. 1137-43.) The trial court agreed that his ruling did not dispose of the entire 
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case and that the matter could properly be certified for interlocutory appeal when the 
proper papers were presented to the court. (R. 407.) 
37. A proposed Order was then submitted to the trial court which 
memorialized the trial court's ruling regarding the mail-in ballot issue and the trial court's 
deferral of the standing issue. (R. 467-71, attached as Appendix B.) 
38. Plaintiffs objected to the form of the Order on the ground that the Order 
should include a finding that the Plaintiffs did have standing under Rule 23.1. (R. 434.) 
In its responsive memorandum, Highland Estates pointed out to the trial court that: 
This Court has not ruled out the possibility that, at the trial of this 
matter, sufficient evidence will be presented establishing that the 
LeVangers do not have standing to bring a derivative action. This 
Court has not ruled as a matter of law that the LeVangers do have 
standing to bring the derivative action. No cross motion for 
summary judgment was filed by the plaintiffs in that regarding and 
no ruling has been made by this Court finding as a matter of law 
that the LeVangers do have standing to bring a derivative action. 
(R. 442-43, attached as Appendix C.) 
39. The trial court agreed with Highland Estates, denied Plaintiffs' 
objections, refused to include a finding that Plaintiffs had standing under Rule 23.1 and 
entered the proposed Order. (R. 431-36.) The Order provided in pertinent part: 
Based upon the aforesaid, the Court now makes the following 
ORDER, JUDGMENT AND DECREE: 
1. The defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby 
granted in part and denied in part as follows: 
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A. All of plaintiffs' claims set forth in plaintiffs' Complaint 
relating to the conduct of the members of the Board of Trustees of 
Highland Estates in the manner in which the Amendment to 
Declaration of Restrictive and Protective Covenants was voted on 
and approved are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
B. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as it related 
to all other claims in plaintiffs' Complaint is hereby denied. 
(R. 471, attached as Exhibit B.) 
40. Judge Nehring's Order granted partial summary judgment for Highland 
Estates and included specific findings of fact and conclusions of law holding, as a matter 
of law, that the actions taken by the Trustees of Highland Estates, that led to the adoption 
of the Amended CC&R's, were proper and that the mail-in ballot voting procedures 
substantially complied with the by-laws and the 1972 CC&R's, and that no prejudice to 
the homeowners of Highland Estates occurred as a result of mail-in balloting. (R. 470, 
attache as Exhibit B.) 
41. Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Reconsider Order Granting Summary 
Judgment or, in the Alternative, to Certify the Order as Final and Appealable pursuant to 
Rule 54(b). (R. 482-798.) Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider was based on purportedly 
newly discovered evidence. (R. 483.) The Motion to Reconsider was denied by the trial 
court. (R. 1017.) 
42. On October 7, 1998, after a hearing argument on Plaintiffs Motion to 
Reconsider, Judge Brian denied the Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider. Judge Brian agreed 
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to certify Judge Nehring's Partial Summary Judgment Order for Appeal. (R. 1063-66, 
attached as Exhibit D.) 
43. The Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal on March 31, 1999. (R. 1074.) 
The case was transferred to the Court of Appeals by Order dated May 18, 1999. (R. 
1145.) 
44. On April 13, 2000, this Court issued a decision reported as Levanger 
v. Vincent. 3 P.3d 187 (Utah Ct App. 2000). (R. 1173-82, attached as Exhibit E.) This 
Court reversed the trial court's order of partial summary judgment and determined that 
the Association did not comply with the statutory and by-law requirements when it 
accepted mail-in ballots regarding the 1995 Amendments. (R. 1182.) 
45. On September 15, 2001, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment with the trial court seeking: (1) that the 1995 Amended CC&R's be rescinded; 
(2) that any subsequent actions based upon the 1995 Amended CC&R's be declared void; 
and (3) that the LeVangers be awarded attorneys fees and costs. (R. 1194-95.) 
46. Following a 56(f) continuance, Defendant moved the trial court to hold 
an evidentiary hearing on the factual issues relating to whether Plaintiffs were legally 
entitled to attorneys fees, including standing under Rule 23.1. (R. 1269-71, 1430-33.) In 
addition, Defendant opposed the Motion for Summary Judgment arguing: (1) the 
LeVangers had no standing to bring their claims as they did not fairly and adequately 
represent the association as required by Rule 23.1 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
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(2) that the LeVangers had not conferred a substantial benefit on Highland Estates that 
would entitle them to collect attorneys fees; and (3) that the claimed fees were not 
reasonable.2 (R. 1311-12, 1384-89.) 
47. Oral argument on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Defendant's Motion for Evidentiary Hearing was held on June 26, 2001. (R. 16343, p. 2.) 
At that hearing, defense counsel explained that the issue of standing under Rule 23.1 and 
the issue of substantial benefit had not been decided as follows: 
Mr. Belnap: So I don't know if there's anything left to try on the 
lawsuit itself, based on that previous discussion at the time of 
summary judgment, but we certainly do have a concern which 
we've raised in our papers about benefit, success in the litigation. 
Also, do the LeVangers fairly represent -
The Court: Oh, yea, the derivative. Yea. 
Mr. Belnap: - the derivative issue, Judge, and then simply on the 
fees themselves, we don't think that there's - that they meet Utah 
law's evidentiary requirement for the showing. 
The Court: You've raised a lot of issues, all around the same 
essential issue of the fees, and they seem to be very fact-intensive. 
(R. 1634, pp. 3-4.) 
2
 Highland Estates is not renewing its arguments regarding the reasonableness of the 
attorneys fees as part of this appeal. 
3
 While a transcript of the June 26, 2001 and September 19, 2001 hearings was requested 
by the Defendant pursuant to this appeal and was prepared, the transcript was not included in the 
paginated record prepared for this matter. As such the parties have entered into a stipulation to 
correct this oversight and to number the first page of the transcript as 1634 and will correct the 
oversight with the trial court and appellate court clerks as called for under Rule 11. 
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48. The court then granted Defendant's Motion for Evidentiary Hearing and 
scheduled atrial for September 19, 2001. (R. 1555.) 
49. The trial was held on September 19, 2001 before Judge Hilder. (R. 
1634, p. 15.) The trial court began the trial by inquiring whether Plaintiffs needed to 
conduct any additional discovery before proceeding with the trial, to which Plaintiffs' 
counsel responded that no additional discovery was required. (R. 1634, p. 15.) In 
addition, the trial court stated that if Plaintiffs needed to add any additional evidence or 
argument they could do so via additional briefing after the trial. (R. 1634, p. 33.) 
50. The trial court then inquired of Plaintiffs' counsel as to whether any 
additional issues were left in the case beyond whether the Plaintiffs were legally entitled 
to attorneys fees. (R. 1634, pp. 16-19.) Plaintiffs'counsel responded that they were 
prepared to present evidence and legal argument on the issues set forth in the summary 
judgment briefing which were the only issues left in the case. (R. 1634, p. 19, 21.) 
51. During opening statements, defense counsel began by discussing the 
issue of standing under Rule 23.1 as follows: 
Mr. Belnap: Because the cases have looked at a couple of 
issues. And one of them - and they have revolved around whether 
there's an economic antagonism, and they revolve around whether 
these people fairly represent all of the home owners. 
Now, as stated right in their complaint, what led to the filing 
of this lawsuit is that the LeVangers did not pay their assessments 
for a number of years. Their property was liened. That upset them. 
They wrote letters indicating that they were very upset about that 
19 
and basically claimed they didn't think the Association had the 
right to assess or to lien, and then this lawsuit started up. 
# * * 
And, very briefly, Rule 23 requires that, the derivative action may 
not be maintained if it appears the plaintiff does not fairly and 
adequately represent the interests of the shareholders or members 
similarly situated and enforcing the rights of the corporation. 
On page 11 of [the Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment], we have cited what is absolute Black letter 
law from all around the jurisdictions on Rule 23. And that law is 
that the persons seeking recovery must not have interests that are 
antagonistic to those of the other shareholders or members. And 
then the cases, you can yield out eight points from them. And the 
two that I want a moment on, Judge, is the cases say if there is 
economic antagonism, they're not representative of the class. 
In this case, as set forth in the plaintiffs' complaint, that's 
actually the driving force of what started this lawsuit was economic 
antagonism over assessments and liening of their property. 
(R. 1634, pp. 23,29-30.) 
52. Plaintiffs began their case by proffering the testimony of Plaintiffs' 
attorney Jay Sheen regarding the amount of work that had been performed on the case and 
the reasonableness and necessity of the attorneys fees and costs. (R. 1634, pp. 33-40.) 
53. Plaintiffs then proceeded to proffer the testimony of attorney Hardin 
Whitney regarding the reasonableness and necessity of the attorneys fees and costs. (R. 
1634, pp. 42-45.) 
54. Plaintiffs then proffered and took testimony from defense counsel Paul 
Beinap regarding the amount of attorneys fees incurred on the defense side of the case. 
(R. 1634, pp. 46-49, 74-79.) 
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55. Plaintiffs then rested their case as follows: 
Mr. Robinson: Okay. That's all I have. 
The Court. Thank you. Do you have anything else to offer in terms 
of witnesses or proffer at this time? 
Mr. Robinson: No. 
(R. 1634, p. 79.)4 
56. With Plaintiffs resting their case. Defendant then moved for a 
directed verdict on the basis that Plaintiffs had presented no evidence whatsoever 
regarding either standing under Rule 23.1 or substantial benefit despite the "fact that these 
issues had been raised in the briefing and at the hearing. (R. 1634, pp. 79-84, attached as 
Appendix F.) 
57. The trial court took the motion under advisement. (R. 1634, p. 99.) 
58. Defendant then proffered the testimony of the Lance Swedish - the 
former president of Highland Estates and a current board member - as to the following 
facts: 
a. The LeVangers' lawsuit has very little, if any, support among the members 
of the Association. (R. 1634, pp. 103-05.) 
b. The LeVangers'lawsuit has conferred no benefit on the Association. In 
4
 While both Plaintiffs attended the hearing, neither Plaintiff offered any live or proffered 
testimony. (R. 1634, 15-150.) 
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fact, the LeVangers' lawsuit has inflicted a substantial and severe detriment to 
the operations and purposes of the Association and to the interests of the 
individual homeowners within the Association. (R. 1634, pp. 103-05.) 
c. That the LeVangers' lawsuit has caused the Association to forestall taking 
actions with respect to improvements and planning. (R. 1634, pp. 103-05.) 
d. The LeVangers' lawsuit has created a sense of frustration amongst the 
Board of Trustees as well as a concern that the LeVangers will bring 
additional unnecessary lawsuits that will cost the Association additional funds. 
(R. 1634, pp. 103-05.) 
e. The Association has been reluctant to use the dues it has collected for fear 
that such funds would be needed to defend against the LeVangers' lawsuit. 
(R. 1634, pp. 103-05.) 
f. The LeVangers' lawsuit has had the effect of discouraging participation on 
the Board of Trustees and within the Association as a whole. (R. 1634, pp. 
103-05.) 
g. Even after the commencement of this lawsuit, Rebecca LeVanger has 
continued to protest, object and threaten the Board of Trustees and members of 
the Association with legal action. This lawsuit has greatly interfered with the 
actions of the Board of Trustees and the desires of the Association as a whole. 
(R. 1634, pp. 103-05.) 
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h. That Highland Estates did not take any action based upon the 1995 
CC&R's and that the rescinding of those documents would not impact the 
association in any way. (R. 1634, pp. 101-03.) 
59. Defendant then called attorney James R. Blakesley to testify 
regarding the issues of reasonableness of the attorneys fees and whether Highland Estates 
had received a substantial benefit as a result of the LeVangers' lawsuit. (R. 1634, p. 106.) 
60. Mr. Blakesley testified that Highland Estates had taken very limited 
actions since the 1995 CC&R's were adopted and that those actions were based entirely 
on authority in prior operating documents. (R. 1634, p. 112.) In addition, as an expert 
witness, Mr. Blakesley testified that in his opinion there was no substantial benefit to 
Highland Estates from the LeVangers' lawsuit for four reasons: 
a. First, Mr. Blakesley stated that because the Utah State Legislature amended 
the Non-Pro fit Act in May of 2000 - one month after this Court's prior 
decision - to allow mail-in balloting, the voting rights of the members of 
Highland Estates had not been altered in any way by the LeVangers' lawsuit. 
(R. 1634, pp. 113-17.) 
b. Second, Mr. Blakesley testified that there was no common fund created by 
the LeVangers' lawsuit and therefore there was no possibility of unjust 
enrichment on the part of the association that would justify an award of 
attorneys fees from the common fund. (R. 1634, pp. 113-17.) 
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c. Third, Mr. Blakesley testified that Highland Estates realized a net deficit 
rather than a substantial benefit given that Highland Estates' operating fund 
would be entirely depleted by the payment of the LeVangers' attorney fees. 
(R. 1634, pp. 113-17.) 
d. Fourth, Mr. Blakesley testified that the LeVangcrs' lawsuit had no day-to-
day effect on the operation of Highland Estates. (R. 1634, pp. 113-17.) 
61. At the close of the trial, the trial court instructed the parties to submit 
written closing arguments. (R. 1634, p. 148.) 
62. The standing issue was addressed by both parties in their written 
closing arguments. (R. 1511-1547.) 
63. On November 27, 2001, the trial court entered a Ruling which 
effectively denied Defendant's motion for directed verdict and granted Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Summary Judgment on attorneys fees and costs. (R. 1551-53, attached as Appendix 
G.) 
64. As to the issue of standing, the trial court held: 
[W]hether plaintiffs' had standing to bring this derivative action (as 
proper representatives of the class under Rule 23.1, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure), was effectively, if not expressly, decided by 
Judge Nehring, when he opined that there were insufficient facts to 
determine, on summary judgment, that plaintiffs "are inappropriate 
parties to bring this action." Judge Nehring did not then defer the 
matter for an evidentiary hearing. Instead, he decided the matter, 
albeit adversely to plaintiffs, on the merits. 
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The next time the standing issue could have been addressed was on 
appeal. The record, however, reflects, that neither party briefed the 
issue for the Court of Appeals. This court cannot say whether the 
appellate court considered the issue sua sponte, but the court can 
read from the decision that no ruling was entered regarding 
standing. What did happen was that the Court of Appeals reached 
the merits, which they could not have done had they considered that 
plaintiffs are inappropriate parties. Thus, acceptance of plaintiffs' 
standing to bring the action is implicit in the court's decision. 
While the court believes the foregoing reasoning is dispositive of 
the standing issue, defendants' failure to raise the issue at the Court 
of Appeals, or to file an appropriate motion on remand, both 
support a conclusion that defendants did, in fact, waive the standing 
issue. 
(R. 1551, attached as Appendix G.) 
65. On December 16, 2001, the Court entered an Order granting the 
LeVangers $41,327.15 in attorneys fees and costs. (R. 1554-55.) In its entirety, the 
Order provided as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs have standing to pursue this matter and to seek 
their attorneys fees and costs from defendant Highland Estates 
Properties Owners Association, Inc., as derivative plaintiffs under 
Rule 23.1 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2. Plaintiffs have conferred a substantial benefit on members 
of the Highland Estates Properties Owners Association who are 
similarly situated. 
3. Plaintiffs are awarded attorneys' fees of $39,174.00 and 
costs of $2,153.15, for a total award of $41,327.15, to be paid by 
The Highland Estates Properties Owners Association, Inc. 
(R. 1555-56, attached as Appendix H.) 
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D. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT. 
Rule 23.1 requires a plaintiff in a derivative action to show that they fairly and 
adequcitely represent the interests of the defendant organization. See Utah R. Civ. P. 23.1 
Plaintiffs' presented their case as a derivative action brought under Rule 23.1. (R. 1-9.) 
Highland Estates set forth as an affirmative defense Plaintiffs' failure to meet their 
burden of showing fair and adequate representation of the association. (R. 73-77.) 
Despite the fact that this defense was raised at the very beginning of the case, 
and despite the fact that the issue of standing was raised a number of times throughout the 
case, the Plaintiffs failed to present the trial court with any evidence indicating that they 
fairly or adequately represented the interests of the members of Highland Estates. (R. 
1634, pp. 15-150.) In fact, all of the evidence presented at the trial of this matter 
indicated that the LeVangers1 lawsuit had provided no benefits to Highland Estates. (R. 
1634, pp. 101-03.) Instead, the LeVangers' lawsuit has had a chilling effect on the 
operations and purpose of the association. (R. 1634, pp. 101-03.) 
Because Plaintiffs failed to present any evidence on the issue of standing 
under Rule 23.1 and because this issue was properly preserved at the trial court level, the 
trial court incorrectly denied Defendants' motion for a directed verdict on the issue of 
standing. As such, this Court should reverse the trial court's ruling and determine that 
Plaintiffs did not make a showing that they fairly and adequately represented Highland 
Estates as required by Rule 23.1. 
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Similarly, Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they conferred any real or actual 
benefit on the association. In fact, all of the evidence presented to the trial court indicates the 
exact opposite, that Highland Estates has been severely harmed by Plaintiffs' use of litigation to 
carry out a personal vendetta against certain members of the association. Accordingly, the trial 
court incorrectly denied Highland Estates' Motion for Directed Verdict on the issue of 
substantial benefit. 
E. MARSHALING OF THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE TRIAL 
COURT'S FINDINGS. 
As set forth fully above, at no time in the course of this case did Plaintiffs 
present any evidence whatsoever that indicated that they fairly and adequately represented 
the interests of Highland Estates under Rule 23.1. Similarly, Plaintiffs presented no 
evidence that they had conferred a substantial benefit on Highland Estates. This fact 
remained true despite numerous opportunities to present such evidence. In fact, a trial 
was scheduled by the trial court for September 19, 2001 to specifically address the issues 
regarding whether Plaintiffs were legally entitled to attorneys fees, including the issues of 
standing and substantial benefit. Plaintiffs presented absolutely no evidence regarding 
either issues at the trial. (R. 1634, pp. 15-150.) 
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ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO MEET THEIR BURDEN OF 
SHOWING THAT THEY FAIRLY AND ADEQUATELY 
REPRESENTED THE MEMBERS OF HIGHLAND 
ESTATES. 
Rule 23.1 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a plaintiff to a 
derivative action must show that they fairly and adequately represent the members of a 
corporation. (See Utah R. Civ. P. 23.1.) Because Plaintiffs presented no evidence that 
they fairly and adequately represented the interests of the members of Highland Estates, 
and because all evidence presented at the trial of this matter indicated that the LeVangers 
did not represent the interests of Highland Estates, the trial court incorrectly found that 
Plaintiffs had standing under Rule 23.1. 
Rule 23.1 governs the procedural requirements for derivative actions by 
shareholders on behalf of corporations. In general, Rule 23.1 allows one or more 
shareholders, perceiving that the corporation has received an injury that the management 
of the corporation has failed to address, sues on behalf of the corporation. It is a suit by 
the corporation, asserted by the shareholders on its behalf against those liable to it. See, 
e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984). Any recovery in a derivative 
action inures to the corporation, not the individual shareholders, who bring suit. See Ross 
v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970). 
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Rule 23.1 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
Any derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or 
members to enforce a right of a corporation or of an unincorporated 
association, the corporation or association having failed to enforce 
a right which may properly be asserted by it, the complainant shall 
be verified and shall allege (1) that the plaintiff or shareholder or 
member at the time of the transaction of which he complains or that 
his share or membership thereafter dissolved on him by operation 
of law, and (2) that the action is not a collusive one to confer 
jurisdiction on a court of the United States which it would not 
otherwise have. The complaint shall also allege with particularity 
the efforts, if any, made by die plaintiff to obtain the action he 
desires from the directors or comparable authority, and, if 
necessary, from the shareholders or members, and the reasons for 
his failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort. The 
derivative action may not be maintained if it appears that the 
plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the 
shareholders or members similarly situated and enforcing the right 
of the corporation or association. The action shall not be dismissed 
or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the 
proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to shareholders or 
members in such manner as the court directs. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 23.1 (emphasis added). 
Under this Rule, the derivative action plaintiffs should have no right, title or 
interest in the claim itself. See Richardson v. Arizona Fuels Corp.. 614 P.2d 636, 638 
(Utah 1980). To protect against this, Rule 23.1 requires an affirmative showing on the 
part of the derivative plaintiffs. As courts have stated, "[t]he rationale of Rule 23.1 is 
two-fold. On the one hand, it would allow a plaintiff to proceed with discovery and trial if 
the plaintiff complies with this rule and can articulate a reasonable basis to be entrusted 
with a claim that belongs to the corporation. On the other hand, the rule does not permit a 
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stockholder to cause the corporation to expend money and resources in discovery and trial 
in the stockholder's quixotic pursuit of a purported corporate claim based solely on 
conclusions, opinions or speculation." Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254-55 (Del. 
2000). Where a derivative action plaintiff fails to meet their burden under Rule 23.1, they 
may not maintain their claims. See id; Utah R. Civ. P. 23.1. 
Rule 23.1 was designed to protect against certain kinds of abuse stemming 
from derivative actions. First, Rule 23.1 seeks to prevent the unrestrained use of 
derivative actions by shareholders or members which would undermine the basic 
principle of corporate governance, which is that the decisions of the corporation should 
be made by its management. See Daily Income Fund. Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 530 
(1984). Derivative actions have been characterized as a remedy of last resort because 
these actions impinge on the inherent role of corporate management to conduct the affairs 
of the corporation, including the power to bring suit. .See Renfor v. FTIC, 773 F.2d 657, 
658 (5th Cir. 1985). One way that Rule 23.1 protects the corporation from abuse of 
derivative actions is by requiring that the plaintiff fairly and adequately represent the 
interests of other members similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation or 
association. For plaintiff to be a fair and adequate representative, the plaintiff must have 
the capacity to vigorously and conscientiously prosecute a derivative suit and must not 
have interests that are antagonistic to those of the other shareholders or members. See 
Shamrock Assocs. v. Horizon Corp., 632 F. Supp. 566, 570-571 (SDNY 1986). Fair and 
30 
adequate representation is especially important in a non-profit association where all 
shareholders are similarly situated. Moreover, fair and adequate representation is crucial 
because the rights and interests of absent persons may be conclusively determined. See 
Maver v. Development Corp. of America, 396 F.Supp. 917 (D. C. Del. 1975). 
Courts have held that the following factors determine the adequacy of the 
representative plaintiff: 
1. Economic antagonism between the representative and the class; 
2. The remedy sought by the plaintiff in a derivative action; 
3. Indications that the named plaintiff was not the driving force behind the 
litigation; 
4. Plaintiffs unfamiliarity with the litigation; 
5. Other litigation pending between the plaintiff and the defendant; 
6. The relative magnitude of the plaintiffs personal interests in 
matters beyond the scope of the derivative action, as compared to 
his or her interest in the derivative action; 
7. The plaintiffs vindictiveness towards the defendants; and 
8. The degree of support the plaintiff received from the other 
members that he or she purports to represent. 
New Crawford Valley, Ltd. v. Benedict 847 P.2d 642 (Colo. App. 1993); Fratis v. 
Corned, Inc., 619 F.2d 588, 593-594 (6th Cir. 1980); GA Enters., Inc. v. Leisure Living 
Communities, Inc., 517 F.2d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 1975); Vanderbilt v. Geo-Energy, Ltd., 725 
F.2d 204, 207 (3rd Cir. 1983); Larsen v. Dumke, 900 F.2d 1363, 1368 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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A. Plaintiffs Presented No Evidence Whatsoever That They 
Fairly and Adequately Represented the Interests of Highland 
Estates. 
Despite the express requirements of Rule 23.1 and the defenses set forth in 
Highland Estates' Answer, Plaintiffs never met their burden by showing that they fairly 
and adequately represent the interests of Highland Estates. In fact, all of the evidence 
presented to the trial court indicated that Plaintiffs did not properly represent the interests 
of the association and that their lawsuit had a destructive effect on its efforts and purposes. 
It was well understood by the parties and the trial court that the issue of 
standing would be addressed at the September 19, 2001 trial. This issue had been raised 
with the trial court in Defendant's Answer. (R. 73-77.) The issue was again raised in 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed on November 26, 1997. (R. 201-302.) 
After remand, the standing issue was again brought before the trial court in Defendant's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs" Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 1284-
1389.) In addition, the standing issue was the subject of Defendant's Motion for 
Evidentiary Hearing. (R. 1269-71, 1284-1389,1430-33.) 
At the June 26, 2001 hearing that was scheduled to address Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Summary Judgment and Defendant's Motion for Evidentiary Hearing, counsel for 
Highland Estates specifically stated that a trial would be needed to address several issues, 
including the issue of standing under Rule 23.1. (R. 1369-71, 1284-1389, 1430-33.) 
Defendant pointed out to the trial court that Plaintiffs had yet to produce any affirmative 
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showing under Rule 23.1 that would demonstrate that the Plaintiffs fairly and adequately 
represented the interests of Highland Estates. (Id.) Accordingly, the trial court granted 
Defendant's Motion for Evidentiary Hearing and scheduled a trial for September 19, 2001. 
(R. 1634, p. 15.) 
At the beginning of the trial, Plaintiffs informed the court that there was no 
additional discovery that they wished to conduct and that there were no additional issues in 
the case beyond those to be addressed at the trial, including Rule 23.1 standing. (R. 1634, 
pp. 16-19.) Plaintiffs then waived their opening statement. (R. 1634, p. 21.) 
During Defendant's opening statement, defense counsel informed the trial 
court that there was a complete lack of evidence regarding standing from the Plaintiffs. 
(R. 1634, pp. 21-24, 29-31.) Defendant also explained that, in addition to Plaintiffs not 
meeting their burden under Rule 23.1, it would put on evidence that affirmatively showed 
that the Plaintiffs did not fairly and adequately represent the interests of Highland Estates, 
that the LeVangers' lawsuit had served as a substantial detriment to the operations and 
purposes of the association, and that the LeVangers did not have the support of the 
members of Highland Estates. (R. 1634, pp. 29-31.) 
At the close of opening statements, Plaintiffs then proceeded to present 
evidence to the trial court via proffered and live testimony. (R. 1634, pp. 33-34.) 
Plaintiffs did not put on any evidence whatsoever regarding the issue of standing under 
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Rule 23.1 or substantial benefit. (R. 1634, pp. 15-150.) In fact, Plaintiffs completely 
refused to address Rule 23.1 in any way. (Id.) 
At the close of Plaintiffs' case, Defendant then moved for a directed verdict on 
the basis that Plaintiffs had presented no evidence whatsoever regarding standing under 
Rule 23.1, despite the fact that these issues had been raised in the briefing and at the 
opening of the trial. (R. 1634, pp. 79-84.) After a discussion on the record, the trial court 
took the motion under advisement. (R. 1634, p. 99.) 
Defendant then proffered the testimony of the Lance Swedish - the former 
president of Highland Estates and a current board member. Mr. Swedish testified that the 
LeVangers' lawsuit has very little, if any, support among the members of the Association. 
(R. 1634, pp. 103-05.) Mr. Swedish also testified that the LeVangers' lawsuit had 
conferred no benefit on the Association. In fact, Mr. Swedish testified that the LeVangers' 
lawsuit had inflicted a substantial and severe detriment to the operations and purposes of 
Highland Estates and to the interests of the individual homeowners within the Association. 
(R. 1634, pp. 103-05.) According to Mr. Swedish, these detriments included the fact that 
the LeVangers' lawsuit had caused the Association to forestall taking actions with respect 
to improvements and planning for fear of having to use the Association's funds to defend 
against the LeVanger's current and future threatened lawsuits. (R. 1634, pp. 103-05.) In 
addition, Mr. Swedish testified that the LeVangers' lawsuit has created a sense of 
frustration amongst the Board of Trustees as well as a concern that the LeVangers would 
bring additional unnecessary lawsuits that would cost the Association additional funds. 
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(R. 1634, pp. 103-05.) As a result, the Association had been reluctant to use the dues it 
has collected for fear that such funds would be needed to defend against the LeVangers' 
lawsuit. (R. 1634, pp. 103-05.) 
Mr. Swedish also testified that the LeVangers' lawsuit had the effect of 
discouraging participation on the Board of Trustees and within the Association as a whole. 
(R. 1634, pp. 103-05.) In fact, even after the commencement of this lawsuit Plaintiffs 
continued to protest, object, bully and threaten the Board of Trustees and various members 
of the Association with legal action, not only against the association but also against the 
individuals themselves. (R. 1634, pp. 103-05.) As such, Mr. Swedish testified that the 
LeVanger's lawsuit had greatly interfered with the actions of the Board of Trustees and the 
desires of the Association as a whole. (R. 1634, pp. 103-05.) 
Finally, Mr. Swedish testified that after the LeVangers had expressed concerns 
about the 1995 CC&R's, Highland Estates determined that it would not take any actions 
based on the amendments. Instead, the association continued to operate based only upon 
the authority of the preexisting operating documents that were still in effect. As such, Mr. 
Swedish testified that the rescinding of those documents would not impact the association 
in any way. (R. 1634, pp. 101-03.) Mr. Swedish's testimony remained undisputed. 
Defendant then called attorney James R. Blakesley as an expert witness to 
testify regarding the impact the LeVangers' lawsuit had had on Highland Estates. (R. 
1634, p. 106.) Mr. Blakesley testified that Highland Estates had taken very limited actions 
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since the 1995 CC&R's were adopted and that those actions were based entirely on 
authority in prior operating documents. (R. 1634, p. 112.) In addition, as an expert 
witness, Mr. Blakesley testified that in his opinion there was no substantial benefit to 
Highland Estates from the LeVangers' lawsuit. (R. 1634, p. 112.) Mr. Blakesley stated 
that because the Utah State Legislature amended the Non-Pro fit Act in May of 2000 - one 
month after this Court's prior decision - to allow mail-in balloting, the voting rights of the 
members of Highland Estates had not been altered in any way by the LeVanger's lawsuit. 
(R. 1634, pp. 113-17.) Mr. Blakesley also testified that there was no common fund created 
by the LeVangers' lawsuit and therefore there was no possibility of unjust enrichment on 
the part of the association that would justify an award of attorneys fees from the common 
fund. (R. 1634, pp. 113-17.) 
In addition, Mr. Blakesley testified that Highland Estates realized a net deficit 
rather than a substantial benefit given that Highland Estates' operating fund would be 
entirely depleted by the payment of the LeVangers' attorney fees. (R. 1634, pp. 113-17.) 
Mr. Blakesley also testified that the LeVangers' lawsuit had no day-to-day effect on the 
operation of Highland Estates. (R. 1634, pp. 113-17.) Mr. Blakesley's testimony 
regarding standing remained undisputed. 
At the close of the evidentiary hearing, the trial court instructed the parties 
to submit written closing arguments. (R. 1643, p. 148.) In its Written Closing Argument, 
Highland Estates argued once again that Plaintiffs had failed to present the trial court with 
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any evidence whatsoever during the trial that they fairly and adequately represented the 
interests of Highland Estates. (R. 1511-26.) Instead, Highland Estates pointed out that the 
only evidence that had been presented at the trial affirmatively showed that the Plaintiffs 
did not fairly and adequately represent the interests of Highland Estates, that the 
LeVangers' lawsuit had served as a substantial detriment to the operations and purposes of 
the association, and that the LeVangers did not have the support of the members of 
Highland Estates. (R. 1511-26.) 
Plaintiffs also submitted a written closing argument where, for the first time, 
they addressed the issue of standing under Rule 23.1. (R. 1527-47.) While Plaintiffs 
acknowledged that they had not presented any evidence to show that they fairly and 
adequately represented the interests of Highland Estates as required by Rule 23.1, they 
argued instead that the issue of standing had previously been decided by Judge Brian, or in 
the alternative, that Highland Estates had somehow waived the issue of standing.5 (R. 
1533.) 
While the two legal issues raised by Plaintiffs are addressed below, it remains 
undisputed in this case that Plaintiffs have made no showing regarding standing under 
5
 Plaintiffs also argued that it was Highland Estates' burden to show that the Plaintiffs 
did not properly represent the association under Rule 23.1. (R. 1533.) However, the trial court 
apparently rejected this argument as it was not set forth in the court's Ruling. Clearly this 
argument ignores the well-accepted case law indicating that derivative action plaintiffs must 
make an affirmative showing under Rule 23.1. See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner. 746 A.2d 244, 254-55 
(Del. 2000). 
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Rule 23.1 in this case. Given the requirements and protections of Rule 23.1, Plaintiffs' 
failure to make any affirmative showing that they fairly and adequately represent the 
interests of Highland Estates and that they did not have a personal right, title or interest in 
the claim itself shows that they are not proper derivative action plaintiffs in this case. 
Because there is no evidence whatsoever supporting the trial court's ruling that Plaintiffs 
have standing under Rule 23.1, and because the only evidence presented at trial indicated 
that the LeVangers do not have standing under Rule 23.1,this Court should reverse the trial 
court's December 11, 2001 Order. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY FOUND THAT 
THE ISSUE OF STANDING HAD BEEN DECIDED AND 
WAIVED. 
After the trial of this matter, the court found that the issue of standing had 
been ^effectively, if not expressly, decided by Judge Nehring, when he opined that there 
were insufficient facts to determine on summary judgment, that plaintiffs 'are 
inappropriate parties to bring this action.'" (R. 1551-53, attached as Appendix G.) The 
trial court also found that the issue of standing was waived when Highland Estates did not 
raise the issue of standing at the interlocutory appeal of this matter before this Court. (R. 
155-53.) Given that Rule 23.1 places the burden on the Plaintiffs to show that they fairly 
and adequately represented Highland Estates, and given that Plaintiffs presented no 
evidence whatsoever on the issue of standing, the trial court was clearly in error on both 
grounds. 
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A. Judge Nehring Did Not Determine the Issue of Standing. 
On November 26, 1997, Highland Estates filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment seeking dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims on two grounds. First, Highland Estates 
argued that Plaintiffs had failed to make a showing that they fairly and adequately 
represented the interests of Highland Estates as Required by Rule 23.1. (R. 201-302.) 
Second, Highland Estates argued that a portion of Plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed as 
Highland Estates had substantially complied with the operating documents and Utah law 
when it allowed mail-in voting to amend the 1995 CC&R's. (Id.) Plaintiff opposed the 
motion on the basis that it was Defendant's burden to show that Plaintiffs did not fairly 
and adequately represent the association and that Highland Estates had not followed the 
operating documents or Utah law in accepting mail-in ballots from its members. (R. 
1101.) The motion was set for oral argument and was heard by Judge Nehring on January 
9, 1998. (R. 1084.) 
After the hearing, Judge Nehring granted Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment finding that Highland Estates had substantially complied with the operating 
documents and Utah law when it allowed mail-in voting to amend the 1995 CC&R's. On 
the issue of standing, the trial court denied the motion and stated as follows: 
The Court: Okay. All right. I'm prepared to rule. First, with 
respect to the standing of the Levangers on the derivative action, 
my determination is that based on the reports that I have seen, 
there are insufficient facts and insufficient grounds to, as a matter 
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of law, determine that the Levangers are inappropriate parties to 
bring an action. 
(R. 1130.) 
Later, after discussing the mail-in voting practice, the trial court stated: 
And to reiterate: I'm at this time denying the motion, for lack of a 
better term, to disqualify the Levangers as derivative action 
claimants, or plaintiffs, which in my view leaves us with the 
remaining claims of the plaintiffs. 
(R. 1135.) 
Plaintiffs' counsel then indicated that he would likely ask the trial court to 
certify the case for interlocutory appeal on the issue of the propriety of the mail-in ballot 
process given that the court's ruling determined a major portion of Plaintiffs' case. 
Plaintiffs' counsel indicated: 
Mr. Sheen: I think I'm leaning toward requesting that this be 
certified so that we get -
The Court: Yes. 
Mr. Sheen: - so we can take that up [on appeal]. It does 
emasculate the case. I don't think it gets rid of it altogether. 
(R. 1136.) Throughout the remainder of the hearing, Plaintiffs' counsel continued to 
emphasize the fact that the ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment did not dispose of 
the entire case. (R. 1137-43.) The trial court agreed that his ruling did not dispose of the 
entire case and that the matter could properly be certified for interlocutory appeal when the 
proper papers were presented to the court. (R. 407.) 
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A proposed Order was then submitted to the trial court which memorialized 
the trial court's ruling regarding the mail-in ballot issue. (R. 467-71, attached as Appendix 
B.) Plaintiffs objected to the form of the Order on the ground that the Order should 
include a finding that the Plaintiffs did have standing under Rule 23.1. (R. 434.) In its 
responsive memorandum, Highland Estates pointed out to the trial court that: 
This Court has not ruled out the possibility that, at the trial of this 
matter, sufficient evidence will be presented establishing that the 
LeVangers do not have standing to bring a derivative action. This 
Court has not ruled as a matter of law that the LeVangers do have 
standing to bring the derivative action. No cross motion for 
summary judgment was filed by the plaintiffs in that regarding and 
no ruling has been made by this Court finding as a matter of law 
that the LeVangers do have standing to bring a derivative action. 
(R. 442-43, attached as Appendix C.) The trial court agreed with Highland Estates, denied 
Plaintiffs' objections, refused to include a finding that Plaintiffs had standing under Rule 
23.1 and entered the proposed Order. (R. 431-36.) The Order provided in pertinent part: 
Based upon the aforesaid, the Court now makes the following 
ORDER, JUDGMENT AND DECREE: 
1. The defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
hereby granted in part and denied in part as follows: 
A. All of plaintiffs' claims set forth in plaintiffs' Complaint 
relating to the conduct of the members of the Board of Trustees of 
Highland Estates in the manner in which the Amendment to 
Declaration of Restrictive and Protective Covenants was voted on 
and approved are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
B. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as it related 
to all other claims in plaintiffs' Complaint is hereby denied. 
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(R. 471, attached as Appendix B.) 
Plaintiffs then filed a Motion to Reconsider Order Granting Summary 
Judgment or, in the Alternative, to Certify the Order as Final and Appealable pursuant to 
Rule 54(b). (R. 482-798.) Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider was based on purportedly 
newly discovered evidence. (R. 483.) The Motion to Reconsider was denied by the trial 
court. (R. 1017.) 
These facts show that Judge Nehring did not decide that Plaintiffs did in fact 
have standing under Rule 23.1. Judge Nehring did rule from the bench that there were 
"insufficient facts and insufficient grounds to, as a matter of law, determine that the 
LeVangers are inappropriate parties to bring an action." (R. 1130, 1135.) However, this is 
something entirely different than a finding of fact that Plaintiffs fairly and adequately 
represented the interests of Highland Estates and that the Plaintiffs had complied with the 
requirements of Rule 23.1. This is affirmed by the fact that Plaintiffs specifically 
requested that the trial court include a finding that the Plaintiffs had standing under Rule 
23.1 when they filed their objections to the Order. (R. 434.) The trial court refused to do 
so and instead simply found that there had been insufficient facts to show as a matter of 
law that Plaintiffs did not have standing. (R. 431-36; 467-71, attached as Appendix B.) 
Given that Rule 23.1 places a burden on Plaintiffs to affirmatively show that 
they fairly and adequately represent the interest of Highland Estates, it cannot be said that 
Judge Nehring's determination that he could not rule as a matter of law that Plaintiffs5 
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were not proper representative of the association under Rule 23.1 resolved the issue of 
standing in this case. Such a finding cannot relieve Plaintiffs from their burden of making 
a showing under Rule 23.1. This is especially true where Plaintiffs have never provided 
the court with evidence showing that they are proper representatives of the association 
even when a trial was specifically held to address this issue - and where all of the 
evidence presented indicated that Plaintiffs were not proper representatives. 
Accordingly, the trial court was incorrect when it determined in its December 
115 2001 Order that Plaintiffs had standing under Rule 23.1 and this Court should reverse 
that Order. 
B. Because The Interlocutory Appeal of This Case Dealt With 
Only a Single Narrow Issue, The Issue of Standing Was Not 
Before This Court In LeVanger I. 
As set forth above, it was accepted by the parties and the trial court that the 
Order of summary judgment did not fully dispose of the case. Plaintiffs indicated to the 
trial court in oral argument and in briefing that they intended to appeal the issue of the 
mail-in ballots. At the hearing on the Motion to Reconsider, counsel for the parties 
stipulated that the matter could be certified for interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 54(b) 
and the trial court so ruled. (R. 1017.) Accordingly, the court entered an Order and Rule 
54(b) Certification which provided in pertinent part: 
Following the ruling of the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion to 
Reconsider, counsel addressed to the Court the issues surrounding 
the status of the case and plaintiffs' desire to have the ruling of 
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Judge Nehring reviewed by an appellate court. Based upon the 
arguments of counsel, the agreement of counsel and this court's 
review of this matter, it is determined by this Court and this Court 
so finds that there is not just reason for delay and the order of the 
Honorable Ronald E. Nehring is hereby certified pursuant to Rule 
54(b) for entry as a final Order and Judgment. It is the opinion of 
this Court, and counsel also have represented to this Court that it 
was the opinion of Judge Nehring that it would be prudent to 
certify this order pursuant to Rule 54(b) since the ruling on the 
summary judgment substantially resolves the determinative issues 
in the above-entitled action and if plaintiff chooses to appeal from 
the same, it would be a substantial savings of judicial resources to 
have that appeal proceed now rather than proceeding through a 
trial and then a subsequent appeal. 
WHEREFORE, based upon the reasons set forth above, it is 
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. That Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider is hereby denied. 
2. The Court certifies the Order of the Honorable Ronald E. 
Nehring dated May 28, 1998 as a final Order and Judgment 
pursuant to Rule 54(b), this Court determining that there is no just 
reason for delay and that judgment should enter pursuant to said 
order. 
(R. 1065-66, attached as Appendix D.) This matter then proceeded to the first appeal 
before this Court pursuant to a Notice of Appeal filed by Plaintiffs on March 31, 1999. 
(R. 1074-75.) 
Rule 54(b) allows for certification of a portion of the case for purposes of 
appeal where other issues of the case remain undecided. The Rule provides in pertinent 
part: 
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(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple 
parties. 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, 
whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, 
and/or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct 
the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than 
all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination by 
the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express 
direction for the entry of judgment. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). 
As set forth above, the trial court certified the single issue of whether the mail-
in ballot process complied with Utah law. (R. 1065-66, attached as Appendix D.) The 
trial court did not certify any other issues in the case as no other issues had been decided. 
(R. 1065-66, attached as Appendix D.) As such, Plaintiffs presented only a single issue to 
this Court in their appeal. As this Court summarized: 
The trial court concluded as a matter of law "that the mail-in ballot 
voting procedure substantially complied with the Bylaws and 
[CC&Rs] in place and that no prejudice to the homeowners of 
Highland Estates occurred as a result of mail-in balloting." 
Plaintiffs argue the amended CC&Rs are ineffectual because 
mail-in balloting is prohibited by the Utah Nonprofit Corporations 
statute and the Association's by-laws. 
LeVanger. 2000 UT APP 103 ^ 10, attached as Appendix E. 
Given that only the mail-in ballot issue had been certified for appeal, neither 
party addressed the issue of standing in their briefs before this Court and this Court did not 
mention standing in its decision. Instead, the issue of standing was reserved for future 
45 
determination of the trial court pursuant to the burdens prescribed by Rule 23.1 as it had 
not been certified for appeal. 
Because the issue of standing was not presented to this Court for decision, and 
because the issue was reserved for future factual determination by the trial court, Highland 
Estates could not have waived the standing issue by not raising it on appeal. Because the 
issue was not presented to the Court in any manner, the standing issue was not determined 
by this Court either expressly or implicitly. Accordingly, the trial court's determination in 
its November 29, 2001 Ruling that the standing issue was waived because it was not 
presented to this Court on appeal is incorrect and the trial court's denial of Defendant's 
Motion for Directed verdict should be reversed by this Court. 
C. Defendant Properly Raised the Issue of Standing on 
Remand to the Trial Court. 
In its November 27, 2001 Ruling, the trial court alternatively found that 
Highland Estates should have raised the standing issue in a motion to the trial court after 
remand of the case from this Court. (R. 1552, attached as Appendix G.) However, the 
trial court overlooked the fact that the issue was presented to the trial court in a motion and 
several pleadings. 
Following remand, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 
1194.) Highland Estates filed for a Rule 56(f) continuance in order to seek additional 
discovery regarding Plaintiffs' claimed attorneys fees. (R. 1230.) Plaintiffs did not 
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oppose the 56(f) Motion. Highland Estates then filed a Motion for Evidentiary Hearing 
seeking a trial on the factual issues regarding whether Plaintiffs were legally entitled to 
attorneys fees, including standing under Rule 23.1. (R. 1269-71, 1430-33.) Highland 
Estates opposed Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on several grounds including 
the standing issue. (R. 1284-1389.) The case then proceeded towards a trial on the 
evidentiary issues as set forth in detail above. Accordingly, it is clear that Highland 
Estates did in fact file a motion before the tiial court on the issue of standing. 
Finally, Rule 23.1 requires Plaintiffs to make a showing in order to bring a 
derivative action. Even though Highland Estates did show that Plaintiffs are not proper 
representatives in this case, Rule 23.1 does not require a derivative action defendant to 
affirmatively show that the plaintiffs lack standing where the plaintiffs have failed to make 
any evidentiary showing whatsoever that they are proper ^representatives of the association. 
As such, the trial court incorrectly found that the Highland Estates waived the standing 
issue. 
III. PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO MEET THEIR BURDEN OF 
SHOWING THAT THEY CONFERRED A SUBSTANTIAL 
BENEFIT ON HIGHLAND ESTATES. 
The second threshold burden Plaintiffs are required to meet is to show, under 
the facts of this case, that they have successfully conferred a substantial benefit on 
Highland Estates. Just as Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate standing before the trial court, 
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Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of showing that they had conferred a substantial 
benefit on Highland Estates. 
Plaintiffs' only evidence regarding this issue is this Court's opinion, where it 
was determined that the mail-in ballot procedure used to adopt the 1995 Amendments was 
not in strict compliance with the Utah Non-Profit Corporations Act. Before the trial court, 
Plaintiffs claimed this decision '"vindicates" the voting rights of the members of Highland 
Estates and that they were therefore legally entitled to over $40,000 in attorney fees. 
However, Plaintiffs presented no factual evidence to the trial court by which it could 
properly determine whether the Court of Appeal's decision substantially benefits the 
members of Highland Estates. 
In reality, Plaintiffs have done nothing that affects the actual voting of the 
association's members in any manner whatsoever. As set forth fully above, according to 
the trial testimony of Lance Swedish and the live testimony of James Blakesley, with the 
exception of the enactment of the 1995 Amendments, the mail-in ballot voting provision 
was never used by the association, either before or after the LeVangers began their 
lawsuit. As such, the resulting effect of the LeVanger's lawsuit was to accrue excessive 
amounts in attorney fees without conferring a substantial benefit on the members of 
Highland Estates. This fact clearly reveals the true motivation behind the LeVangers' 
litigation against individual members of Highland Estates. The undisputed testimony of 
Lance Swedish and James Blakesley, the harmful effects of Plaintiffs' lawsuit extends 
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much further than simply incurring unnecessary attorney fees and has done anything but 
benefit the members of Highland Estates. 
Furthermore, the fleeting nature of Plaintiffs' alleged benefit was established 
by the undisputed testimony of expert witness James Blakesley who testified on September 
19, 2001, that under recently enacted section 16-6a-707, the Plaintiffs' lawsuit could, at 
best, have effected Highland Estates for only a few short months. See U.C.A. § 16-6a-
707. As such, it is hard to imagine how Plaintiffs' lawsuit, which has done far more harm 
than good, could entitle Plaintiffs to an award of over $40,000 in attorney fees. 
As admitted by Plaintiffs at the September 19, 2001 hearing, the determination 
of substantial benefit is a highly fact intensive question that requires the trial court to 
weigh the equities. See Stewart v. Utah Public Service Comm'n., 885 P.2d 759, 783 (Utah 
1994); Barker v. Utah Public Service ConTn., 970 P.2d 702, 708 (Utah 1998). Despite 
Plaintiffs' counsel's agreement with the trial court that a court should weigh the detriments 
and benefits to the association, Plaintiffs presented absolutely no factual evidence that 
could allow the trial court to determine the real and actual effect of this lawsuit on 
Highland Estates. Accordingly, because Plaintiffs have failed to meet their factual burden 
of showing that they have successfully conferred a substantial benefit - as opposed to 
substantial harms - on Highland Estates, the trial court incorrectly denied Highland 
Estates' Motion for Directed Verdict. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, this Couil should hold that the trial court 
incorrectly denied Highland Estates' motion for directed verdict when it found that 
Plaintiffs held standing under Rule 23.1 and had conferred a substantial benefit where 
Plaintiffs failed to present any evidence on these issues to the trial court. 
DATED this ^ ? day of November, 2002. 
STRONG & HANNI 
By - ^ j ^ G ^ 
Paul M. Belnap 
Andrew D. Wright 
Attorneys for Defendant Highland Estates 
Homeowners Association 
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1 out a procedure for amendment. Those procedures 
2 contemplate amendments to be adopted at an annual 
3 meeting, and -- in the absence of a quorum -- at a 
4 reconvened meeting, at which no quorum would be 
5 necessary. 
6 That procedure is, in my view, directly at 
7 odds with the fundamental objective of seeking a 
8 maximization of participation in the decision-making 
9 concern in important matters like amending the bylaws, 
10 amending the CC&R's. 
11 Next: The CC&R's, as they existed in '96, 
12 do not expressly require that changed amendment to be 
13 adopted in the context of a meeting. 
14 The question then is: Did the alternate 
15 voting proceeding comply with the terms of the bylaws 
16 and CC&Rf s? 
17 To answer this question, one has to address 
18 this: Does the determination of that question -- in 
19 other words, did it comply? -- is the proper 
20 analytical method one which would yield a result that 
21 one has to strictly comply with those provisions? 
22 Or is substantial compliance enough to 
23 comply with those provisions? 
24 And resolving that, I look to the way that 
25 the law looks at whether the provisions of a statute 
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1 challenges the alternate process. 
2 In other words, did the voting process have 
3 integrity? It's my conclusion that the record 
4 supports the conclusion that it did have integrity; in 
5 other words, nobody suggested that votes weren't 
6 counted. Nobody suggested that a majority didn't 
7 actually vote for it. 
8 The sanctity of meetings is not the be-all 
9 and end-all of a legitimate decision-making process 
10 concerning corporate governance or amendments to 
11 organic corporate documents. 
12 Under Utah's corporation law for example, 
13 there is express authorization to make decisions 
14 outside the context of a meeting; albeit there is a 
15 requirement that notice be provided. 
16 And I would suggest that here, that there is 
17 certainly, impliedly, notice that there was going to 
18 be a decision, an important decision made outside the 
19 context of the meeting. 
20 Furthermore, whereas here meetings could be 
21 conducted by attendance through proxy, the argument 
22 that meetings are necessary to encourage the vigorous 
23 exchange of views is severely undercut. 
24 If I were to point out, however, the most 
25 salient reason that, in my view, the voting process 
Court ' s Ruling 
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1 was an appropriate substitute, it's this: That based 
2 on the state of the record, the reconvened meeting 
3 process was detrimental to the fundamental objective 
4 of encouraging and maximizing participation in the 
5 decision-making. 
6 The voting process as adopted by the 
7 trustees was clearly directed towards that laudable 
8 objective. I want to just remark briefly on the 
9 contention that failing to participate in meetings was 
10 an affirmative act designed to affirmatively block 
11 actions of the trustees. 
12 It's my belief that that contention is a 
13 weak one, because of the availability of proxies. 
14 First, individuals who are members of an organization 
15 should -- I guess as a moral issue -- exercise their 
16 support or opposition to issues by showing up 
17 affirmatively doing something about it. 
18 That judgmental, general judgmental point of 
19 view is, I believe, brought down to a - - brought to 
20 practical fruition through the proxy process. If you 
21 don't want to go to a meeting, if you're intimidated 
22 by who's going to be there, if you're gone and can't 
23 be there because you're going to be in the Bahamas, 
24 you find somebody you trust and you give them the 
25 proxy, and you have that person show up and vote for 
C o u r t ' s .Ruling-
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1 or in opposition to the issue based on the proxy, 
2 So, all of that is a long way of saying 
3 this: That it's my conclusion that, to the extent 
4 that the plaintiffs' case bears on the propriety of 
5 the amendment process, I'm finding, as a matter of 
6 law, that it does. 
7 And to reiterate: I'm at this time denying 
8 the motion, for lack of a better term, to disqualify 
9 the Levangers as derivative action claimants, or 
10 plaintiffs, which in my view leaves us with the 
11 remaining claims of the plaintiffs. 
12 I guess that would be the gross 
13 mismanagement business; although I'm -- even that is a 
14 little bit unclear to me, because if I've determined 
15 the CC&R amendments are appropriate, that may have 
16 implications for the gross mismanagement issues, and 
17 you have to sort those out; since at some point we're 
18 going to have to decide what's going to be tried and 
19 what's not going to be tried. 
20 So, I'm going to stop talking and let you 
21 weigh in to that somewhat. 
22 MR. BELNAP: Your Honor, I don't believe 
23 there's anything left to try, in view of the court's 
24 ruling. 
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DUPLANTY, RON DUPLANTY, JAN 
NEMCIK, BECKY NELSON, ROSIE 
PETRONF.LL, CORY AT SRFRG. GERALD 
VINCENT, SANDY FISHER, SCOTT 
FEATHERSTONE, MARTIN ROGUSCHKA 
LANCE SWEDISH, LAUREL KANGAS, 
JOHN DOFS 1-5, JANE DOES 1-5, and 
HIGHLAND ESTATES PROPERTIES 
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 970300011 
Judge William B. Bohling 
Defendant, Highland Estates Properties Owners Association, Inc 's, Motion for Summary 
Judgment came on for hearing before the Honorable Ronald E. Nehring on the 9th day of January, 
BOOK A A A PAGE 6 
I U l;r O * 
1998 at the hour of 10:00 a m. E. Jay Sheen appeared on behalf of the plaintiffs. Paul M Belnap and 
H. Burt Ringwood appeared on behalf of the defendant, Highland Estates Properties Owners 
Association (hereinafter referred to as "Highland Estates"). The oral argument having taken place 
9 days prior to the trial of this matter. The Court having considered the defendant's Memorandum 
in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, the plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and considering the evidence presented 
at oral argument, and good cause appearing, having made its ruling from the bench, and desiring to 
set forth the Court's reasoning, the Court makes the following findings and conclusions and orders 
as follows: 
FINDINGS 
1. The Court finds that on or about March 14, 1972, Restrictive Covenants of 
Highland Estates were recorded in the Summit County recorder's office amending the earlier 
Conditions and Restrictions 
2. The Court finds that on or about October 30, 1972, the Articles of 
Incorporation of Highland Estates, were filed with the state of Utah, incorporating Highland Estates 
as a non-profit corporation. 
3. The Court finds that subsequent to the filing of its Articles of Incorporation, 
Highland Estates adopted Bylaws. 
2 
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4. The Court finds that the Bylaws are unamibigous insofar as they set out a 
procedure for amendment to Restrictive Covenants Those procedures contemplate amendments to 
be adopted at an annual meeting, and in the absence of a quorum at the annual meeting at a 
reconvened meeting, at which no quorum would be necessary. 
5. The Court finds that the Restrictive Covenants of Highland Estates, as they 
existed in 1996, do not expressly provide that amendment be adopted in the context of a meeting. 
6. The Court finds that on or about August 23, 1994, attorney Scott Welling, on 
behalf of Highland Estates, prepared a letter to each member of Highland Estates, stating that a copy 
of the proposed Amendment to Declaration of Restrictive and Protective Covenants was attached to 
the letter and a ballot to officially register each members vote of the proposed amendments to the 
Restrictive Covenants. 
7. The Court finds that Mr. Welling's letter, along with a ballot and a voting draft 
of the Amendment to Declaration of Restrictions and Protective Covenants was delivered to the 
members of Highland Estates. 
8. The Court finds that the Amendment to the Declaration of Restrictive and 
Protective Covenants of Highland Estates was approved by a majority of homeowners through mail-
in ballots. 
3 
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9 The Court finds that the record supports the conclusion that the voting process 
had integrity, that all votes were counted properly, and that a majority of homeowners did actually 
vote in favor of the Amended Restrictive Covenants. 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. Based upon the record before the Court, there are insufficient facts and 
insufficient grounds to, as a matter of law, determine that the plaintiffs are inappropriate parties to 
bring this action. 
2. As a matter of law, the actions taken by the trustees of Highland Estates that 
led to the adoption of the Amended Restrictive Covenants was proper. 
3. The Court concludes as a matter of law that the mail-in ballot voting procedure 
substantially complied with the Bylaws and Restrictive Covenants in place and that no prejudice to 
the homeowners of Highland Estates occurred as a result of mail-in balloting. 
Based upon the aforesaid, the Court now makes the following ORDER, JUDGMENT 
AND DECREE: 
1. The defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted in part and 
denied in part as follows: 
A. All of plaintiffs' claims set forth in plaintiffs' Complaint relating to the 
conduct of the members of the Board of Trustees of Highland Estates in the manner in which the 
4 
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Amendment tc Declaration of Restrictive and Protective Covenants was voted on and approved are 
hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
B Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as it relates to all other 
claims in plaintiffs' Complaint is hereby denied 
DATED this the day of 
Approved as to Form: 
E Jay Sheen 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
98. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Ronald E. Nehrifg^J"' ' f ^ J W ^ 
District Court Judge 
m\ 
1 l°ou^ s£f 
""«/ IJ ,h lU\^ 
MAILLNG CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this 2J^ day of March, 1998,1 did mail, first class mail, 
postage prepaid the above Order to the following: 
E Jay Sheen 
Robinson & Sheen 
77 West 200 South, Suite 420 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
^j^Cytt^_ 
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JOANN VINCENT, KEN FISHER, DIANE 
DUPLANTY, RON DUPLANTY, JAN 
NEMCIK, BECKY NELSON, ROSIE 
PETRONELL, CORY ALSBERG, GERALD 
VINCENT, SANDY FISHER, SCOTT 
FEATHERSTONE, MARTIN ROGUSCHKA 
LANCE SWEDISH, LAUREL KANGAS, 
JOHN DOES 1-5, JANE DOES 1-5, and 
HIGHLAND ESTATES PROPERTIES 
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Defendants. 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' 
OBJECTION TO FORM OF ORDER 
Civil No. 970300011 
Judge William B. Bohling 
Defendant, Highland Estates Properties Owners Association, Inc, by and through counsel 
of record, respectfully submits this response to plaintiffs' Objection to Form of Order 
0 4 x 0 
RESPONSE TO OBJECTIONS TO FINDINGS 
Plaintiffs have objected to paragraphs 4 through 8 of defendant's proposed Order's 
Findings primarily on the basis that the findings are not supported by facts in the record and plaintiffs 
contend that some of the Findings are irrelevant Defendant's proposed Order's Findings are indeed 
supported by the record and this Court's ailing in open court as follows 
Paragraph 4 is a direct quote from this Court's ruling in open court in which the Court 
stated as follows 
The Bylaws are unambiguous insofar as they set out a 
procedure for amendment Those procedures 
contemplate amendments to be adopted at an annual 
meeting, and in the absence of a quorum, at a 
reconvened meeting, at which no quorum would be 
necessary 
(See Exhibit A attached) 
Paragraph 5 of the proposed Order's Findings is also a direct quote from this Court's 
ruling in open court as follows 
The CC & R's, as they existed in 1996, do not 
expressly require that changed amendment to be 
adopted in the context of a meeting 
(See Exhibit A attached) 
Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the proposed Order's Findings are supported in the record by 
attorney Welling's Affidavit and deposition testimony of Jo Ann Vincent Plaintiffs have provided 
absolutely no evidence by way of Affidavit or deposition to refute the record This Court, relying 
upon the record before it stated as follows 
(> A A ; 
First, insofar as the record is concerned, that I have 
before me, the W filing letter and the draft CC & R's 
went to everybody who should have got them. That's 
what the reports I have tell me. 
(See Exhibit A attached). 
Paragraphs 8 and 9 are also supported by the deposition testimony of JoAnn Vincent. 
Tliis Court, noting the evidence in the record, and plaintiffs' lack of evidence to dispute the evidence 
stated as follows. 
In other words, did the voting process have integrity? 
It is my conclusion that the record supports the 
conclusion that it did have integrity; in other words, 
nobody suggested that votes weren't counted. 
Nobody suggested that a majority didn't actually vote 
for it. 
RESPONSE TO OBJECTIONS TO CONCLUSIONS 
Plaintiffs also object to each of the Conclusions set forth in the proposed Order. Plaintiffs 
suggest that this Court found as a matter of law that plaintiffs did have standing to bring the 
derivative action. However, this Court did not make such a ruling. This Court stated as follows. 
First, with respect to the standing of the LeVangers on 
the derivative action, my determine is that based on 
the reports that I have seen, there are insufficient facts, 
and insufficient grounds, to, as a matter of law, 
determine that the LeVangers are inappropriate parties 
to bring the action. 
This Court has not ailed out the possibility that, at the trial of this matter, sufficient 
evidence will be presented establishing that LeVangers do not have standing to bring a derivative 
action. Tliis Court has not ruled as a matter of law that the LeVangers do have standing to bring the 
044.2 
derivative action. No cross motion for summary judgment was filed by the plaintiffs in that regard 
and no ruling has been made by this Court finding as a matter of law that the LeVangers do have 
standing to bring a derivative action. 
Plaintiffs object to paragraphs 2 and 3 of the proposed Order's Conclusion on the basis 
that the Conclusions are overly broad The Conclusions are not overly broad, and clearly the 
Conclusions of this Court as set forth by the Court at the hearing on this matter. Specifically, this 
Court stated as follows: 
Turning to the merits of the claim, it is my 
determination, that, as a matter of law, the actions 
taken by the trustees that lead to the adoption of the 
amended CC & R's was proper. . . . That analysis 
requires investigation whether the substitute 
performance - - in this case voting - - was prejudicial 
to the people whose interest were supposed to be 
protected by the unambiguous Bylaws. It is my 
conclusion that, as a matter of law, those protections 
were present and no prejudice occurred. 
RESPONSE TO OBJECTIONS TO ORDER 
The order of this Court was clearly set forth in the Court's ruling in open court. 
PlaintiflFs, again, argue that this Court ruled as a matter of law that plaintiffs were entitled to bring the 
action derivatively. Defendant maintains that this Court simply denied defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment based upon the LeVangers standing to bring this lawsuit derivatively. This Court 
did not find as a matter of law that the LeVangers were entitled to bring the action. The Court simply 
stated that there were insufficient facts in evidence, at this time, to rule as a matter of law, that the 
LeVangers were not entitled to bring the action derivatively. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should execute the proposed Order as presented by defendant. 
DATED this the IV day of March, 1998. 
STRONG & HANNI 
Paul M. Belnap 
H. Burt Ringwoodv 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this _/_2f clay of March, 1998,1 did mail, first class mail, 
postage prepaid the above Response to Plaintiffs' Objection to Proposed Form of Order to the 
following: 
E Jay Sheen 
Robinson & Sheen 
77 West 200 South, Suite 420 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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JOANN VINCENT et al, 
Defendants. 
Reporter's Partial Transcript 
of Hearing on Motion for 
Summary Judgment: 
Court's Ruling 
Case No. 970300011 
Hon. Ronald E. Nehring 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 9th day of January, 
1998, the above-entitled matter continued in hearing in the Courtroom of 
the Summit County Courthouse, Coalville, Utah, before the Honorable 
Ronald E. Nehring, Judge in the Third Judicial District, State of Utah. 
APPEARANCES 
E. Jay Sheen, Attorney-at-Law, 77 West 200 South, Suite 
420, Salt Lake City, UT 84101 Telephone 238-1840 appearing on behalf of 
the plaintiffs Levanger. 
Messrs. Paul M. Belnap, Attorney-at-Law, and H. Burt 
Rinqwood, Attorney-at-Law, Strong & Hanni, Sixth Floor Boston Building, 
No. 9 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, UT 84111 Telephone 532-7080 
appearing on behalf of the defendant Highland Estates Properties Owners 
Association. 
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1 ( W h e r e u p o n , the f o l l o w i n g p r o c e e d i n g s . 
2 c o n i n u e d in o p e n c o u r t : ) 
3 
4 THE C O U R T : O k a y . All r i g h t I'm 
5 p r e p a r e d to r u l e . F i r s t , w i t h r e s p e c t to 
6 the s t a n d i n g of the L e v a n g e r s on the 
7 d e r i v a t i v e a c t i o n , m y d e t e r m i n a t i o n is that 
8 b a s e d on the r e p o r t s that I h a v e s e e n , ther 
9 are i n s u f f i c i e n t facts and i n s u f f i c i e n t 
10 g r o u n d s t o , as a m a t t e r of l a w , d e t e r m i n e 
11 that the L e v a n g e r s are i n a p p r o p r i a t e p a r t i e 
12 to b r i n g an a c t i o n . 
13 T u r n i n g to the m e r i t s of the c l a i m , 
14 it's my d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t , as a m a t t e r of 
15 law, the a c t i o n s t a k e n by the t r u s t e e s that 
16 led to the a d o p t i o n of the a m e n d e d C C & R ' s 
17 was p r o p e r . 
18 A n d I'm g o i n g to tell y o u w h y . It is 
19 t r u e that t h e r e is n o t h i n g — few t h i n g s — 
20 m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l to c o r p o r a t i o n s , e n t i t i e s 
21 in g e n e r a l , t h a n this p r o c e s s by w h i c h t h o s 
22 e n t i t i e s a m e n d t h e i r c h a r t e r s or t h e i r 
23 b e g i n n i n g d o c u m e n t s so to s p e a k . In t h i s 
24 c a s e , and I t h i n k in all c a s e s , the p r i m a r y 



























to e f f e c t c h a n g e s and a m e n d m e n t s to the 
o r g a n i c d o c u m e n t s was to e n c o u r a g e 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n by s y s t e m m e m b e r s , and to 
i n v i t e and s o l i c i t the v o t e s , so to s p e a k , 
of t h o s e m e m b e r s w i t h r e s p e c t to the i s s u e s . 
T h e b y l a w s are u n a n i m o u s i n s o f a r as 
they set out a p r o c e d u r e for a m e n d m e n t . 
T h o s e p r o c e d u r e s c o n t e m p l a t e a m e n d m e n t s to 
be a d o p t e d at an a n n u a l m e e t i n g , and -- in 
the a b s e n c e of a q u o r u m — at a r e c o n v e n e d 
m e e t i n g , at w h i c h no q u o r u m w o u l d be 
n e c e s s a r y . 
T h a t p r o c e d u r e i s , in my v i e w , d i r e c t l y 
at o d d s w i t h the f u n d a m e n t a l o b j e c t i v e of 
s e e k i n g a m a x i m i z a t i o n of p a r t i c i p a t i o n in 
the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g c o n c e r n in i m p o r t a n t 
m a t t e r s l i k e a m e n d i n g the b y l a w s , a m e n d i n g 
the C C & R ' s . 
N e x t : The C C & R ' s , as they e x i s t e d in 
'96, do not e x p r e s s l y r e q u i r e that c h a n g e d 
a m e n d m e n t to be a d o p t e d in the c o n t e x t of a 
m e e t i n g . 
T h e q u e s t i o n then i s : Did the a l t e r n a t e 
v o t i n g p r o c e e d i n g c o m p l y w i t h the t e r m s of 


























To a n s w e r this q u e s t i o n , one has to 
a d d r e s s t h i s : D o e s this d e t e r m i n a t i o n of 
that q u e s t i o n — i n o t h e r w o r d s , did it 
c o m p l y ? — is the p r o p e r a n a l y t i c a l m e t h o d 
one w h i c h w o u l d y i e l d a r e s u l t that one has 
to s t r i c t l y c o m p l y w i t h t h o s e p r o v i s i o n s ? 
Or is s u b s t a n t i a l c o m p l i a n c e e n o u g h to 
c o m p l y w i t h t h o s e p r o v i s i o n s ? 
A n d r e s o l v i n g t h a t , I look to the way 
that the law l o o k s at w h e t h e r p r o v i s i o n s of 
a s t a t u t e s h o u l d be s t r i c t l y c o m p l i e d w i t h , 
or w h e t h e r the p r o v i s i o n of a s t a t u t e m a y be 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y c o m p l i e d w i t h and t h e r e b y m e e t 
the r e q u i r e m e n t s of the s t a t u t e . 
B e c a u s e it s e e m s to me that 
s u b s t a n t i v e -- the s u b s t a n t i a l v e r s u s s t r i c t 
c o m p l i a n c e a n a l y s i s s i t u a t i o n w i t h r e s p e c t 
to s t a t u t e s f i t s , at least r o u g h l y , this 
k i n d of c o n t r a c t s e t t i n g . 
T h a t a n a l y s i s r e q u i r e s i n v e s t i g a t i o n of 
w h e t h e r the s u b s t i t u t e p e r f o r m a n c e - - in t h i s 
c a s e v o t i n g — was p r e j u d i c i a l to the p e o p l e 
w h o s e i n t e r e s t s w e r e s u p p o s e d to be 
p r o t e c t e d by the u n a m b i g u o u s b y l a w s . 
A n d it's my c o n c l u s i o n t h a t , as a 


























m a t t e r of l a w , t h o s e p r o t e c t i o n s w e r e 
p r e s e n t and no p r e j u d i c e o c c u r r e d . I b a s e 
that on the f o l l o w i n g f a c t o r s . 
F i r s t , i n s o f a r as the r e c o r d is 
c o n c e r n e d , t h a t I h a v e b e f o r e m e , the 
W e l l i n g l e t t e r and the d r a f t C C & R ' s went to 
e v e r y b o d y w h o s h o u l d h a v e got t h e m . T h a t ' s 
what the r e p o r t s that I h a v e tell m e . 
W e l l , is t h e r e any c o l l a t e r a l s u p p o r t 
for this? I b e l i e v e t h e r e i s . The m a j o r i t y 
of yes v o t e s c a m e in. S o m e b o d y m u s t h a v e 
k n o w n a b o u t i t . T h e y got the v o t e s . 
T h e r e h a s b e e n no g e n u i n e i s s u e of fact 
p r e s e n t e d w h i c h I can find that l e g i t i m a t e l y 
c h a l l e n g e s the a l t e r n a t e p r o c e s s . 
In o t h e r w o r d s , did the v o t i n g p r o c e s s 
h a v e i n t e g r i t y ? It's my c o n c l u s i o n that the 
r e c o r d s u p p o r t s the c o n c l u s i o n that it did 
h a v e i n t e g r i t y ; in o t h e r w o r d s , n o b o d y 
s u g g e s t e d t h a t v o t e s w e r e n ' t c o u n t e d . N o b o d y 
s u g g e s t e d t h a t a m a j o r i t y d i d n ' t a c t u a l l y 
v o t e for i t . 
The s a n c t i t y of m e e t i n g s is not the 
b e - a l l and e n d - a l l of a l e g i t i m a t e 



























g o v e r n a n c e or a m e n d m e n t s to o r g a n i c 
c o r p o r a t e d o c u m e n t s . 
U n d e r U t a h ' s c o r p o r a t i o n law for 
e x a m p l e , t h e r e is e x p r e s s a u t h o r i z a t i o n to 
m a k e d e c i s i o n s o u t s i d e the c o n t e x t of a 
m e e t i n g ; a l b e i t t h e r e is a r e q u i r e m e n t that 
n o t i c e be p r o v i d e d . 
Antfl w o u l d s u g g e s t that h e r e , that 
t h e r e is c e r t a i n l y , i m p l i e d l y , n o t i c e that 
t h e r e was g o i n g to be a d e c i s i o n , an 
i m p o r t a n t d e c i s i o n m a d e o u t s i d e the c o n t e x t 
of the m e e t i n g . 
F u r t h e r m o r e , w h e r e a s h e r e m e e t i n g s 
c o u l d be c o n d u c t e d by a t t e n d a n c e t h r o u g h 
p r o x y , the a r g u m e n t that m e e t i n g s are 
n e c e s s a r y to e n c o u r a g e the v i g o r o u s e x c h a n g e 
of v i e w s , is s e v e r e l y u n d e r c u t . 
If I w e r e to p o i n t o u t , h o w e v e r , the 
m o s t s a l i e n t r e a s o n t h a t , in my v i e w , the 
v o t i n g p r o c e s s was an a p p r o p r i a t e 
s u b s t i t u t e , it's t h i s : That b a s e d on the 
s t a t e of the r e c o r d , the r e c o n v e n e d m e e t i n g 
p r o c e s s w a s d e t r i m e n t a l to the f u n d a m e n t a l 
o b j e c t i v e of e n c o u r a g i n g and m a x i m i z i n g 



























The v o t i n g p r o c e s s as a d o p t e d by the 
t r u s t e e s w a s c l e a r l y d i r e c t e d t o w a r d s t h a t 
l a u d a b l e o b j e c t i v e . I w a n t to just r e m a r k 
b r i e f l y on the c o n t e n t i o n that f a i l i n g to 
p a r t i c i p a t e in m e e t i n g s was anc a f f i r m a t i v e 
act d e s i g n e d to a f f i r m a t i v e l y b l o c k a c t i o n s 
of the t r u s t e e s . 
It's my b e l i e f that that c o n t e n t i o n is 
a weak o n e , b e c a u s e of the a v a i l a b i l i t y of 
p r o x i e s . F i r s t , i n d i v i d u a l s who are m e m b e r s 
of and o r g a n i z a t i o n s h o u l d — I g u e s s as a 
m o r a l i s s u e — e x e r c i s e t h e i r s u p p o r t or 
o p p o s i t i o n no i s s u e s b y s h o w i n g up and 
a f f i r m a t i v e l y d o i n g s o m e t h i n g about i t . 
That j u d g m e n t a l , g e n e r a l j u d g m e n t a l 
p o i n t of v i e w i s , I b e l i e v e , b r o u g h t d o w n to 
a — b r o u g h t to p r a c t i c a l f r u i t i o n t h r o u g h 
the p r o x y p r o c e s s . If y o u d o n ' t want to go 
to a m e e t i n g , if y o u ' r e i n t i m i d a t e d by w h o ' s 
g o i n g to be t h e r e , if y o u ' r e gone and c a n ' t 
be t h e r e b e c a u s e y o u ' r e g o i n g to be in the 
B a h a m a s , y o u find s o m e b o d y y o u t r u s t and y o u 
give them the p r o x y , and y o u h a v e that 
p e r s o n s h o w up and v o t e for or in o p p o s i t i o n 
to the i s s u e b a s e d on the p r o x y . 


























S o , all of that is a l o n g way of s a y i n g 
t h i s : T h a t i t ' s my c o n c l u s i o n t h a t , to the 
e x t e n t t h a t the p l a i n t i f f ' s c a s e b e a r s on 
the p r o p r i e t y of the a m e n d m e n t p r o c e s s , I'm 
f i n d i n g as a m a t t e r of law that it d o e s . 
A n d to r e i t e r a t e , I'm at t h i s time 
d e n y i n g the m o t i o n , for lack of a b e t t e r 
t e r m , to d i s q u a l i f y the L e v a n g e r s as 
d e r i v a t i v e a c t i o n c l a i m a n t s , or p l a i n t i f f s , 
w h i c h in my v i e w l e a v e s us w i t h the 
r e m a i n i n g c l a i m s of the p l a i n t i f f s . 
I g u e s s that w o u l d be the g r o s s 
m i s m a n a g e m e n t b u s i n e s s , a l t h o u g h e v e n that 
is a l i t t l e b i t u n c l e a r to m e . B e c a u s e if 
I've d e t e r m i n e d that the CC&R a m e n d m e n t s are 
a p p r o p r i a t e , t h a t may have i m p l i c a t i o n s for 
the g r o s s m i s m a n a g e m e n t i s s u e s , and y o u ' l l 
h a v e to s o r t t h o s e o u t ; s i n c e I a s s u m e at 
some p o i n t w e ' r e g o i n g to h a v e to m a k e a 
d e c i s i o n a b o u t w h a t ' s g o i n g to be t r i e d and 
w h a t ' s not g o i n g to be t r i e d . 
So I'm g o i n g to stop t a l k i n g and let 
y o u w e i g h in to that s o m e w h a t . 
MR. B E L N A P : Y o u r H o n o r , I d o n ' t 
b e l i e v e t h e r e ' s a n y t h i n g left to try, in 
8 
1 v i e w of the c o u r t ' s r u l i n g . 
2 T H E C O U R T : You n o , I w o u l d e x p e c t y o u 
3 to say t h a t . But m a y b e the b e s t thing to 
4 d o , is to let the dust s e t t l e . M r . S h e e n 
5 you s e e m a n x i o u s to say s o m e t h i n g . 
6 M R . S H E E N : I t h i n k I want to let the 
7 dust s e t t l e . I'm t h i n k i n g that I'm l e a n i n g 
8 t o w a r d r e q u e s t i n g that this be c e r t i f i e d so 
9 t h a t w e g e t — 
10 T H E C O U R T : Y e s . 
11 M R . S H E E N : -- so we can take that u p . 
12 That d o e s e m a s c u l a t e the c a s e . I d o n ' t t h i n k 
13 it g e t s rid of it all t o g e t h e r . 
14 T H E C O U R T : M r . S h e e n a c t u a l l y r a i s e s a 
15 p r e t t y l e g i t i m a t e p o i n t . We s p e n d a c o u p l e 
16 of d a y s t r y i n g t h i s , some l i t t l e p i e c e or 
17 some b i g p i e c e that I d e c i d e is w h a t ' s l e f t , 
18 and all of t h a t ' s c o n t i n g e n t on me b e i n g 
19 r i g h t on w h a t I just did. We may end up 
20 b e i n g b a c k d o i n g the w h o l e b u s i n e s s a g a i n . 
21 You n o , I t h i n k t h e r e is some m e r i t in w h a t 
22 M r . S h e e n s a y s . P r a c t i c a l l y , w h e r e does 
23 that t a k e u s ? Y o u r c l i e n t may want to w e i g h 
2 4 in . 
25 M R . S H E E N : H e ' s s t a n d i n g up t h e r e 


























b e h i n d m e . 
THE C O U R T : B e s i d e s s t r a n g l i n g m e , of 
c o u r s e . 
C L I E N T : I w o u l d just - - . 
MR. S H E E N : N o , n o . 
THE C O U R T : W e l l , I u n d e r s t a n d . Let me 
just say t h i s in y o u ' r e b e n e f i t . I m a k e no 
claim to i n f a l l i b i l i t y . T h a t ' s why t h e r e are 
a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s . I've done w h a t I d i d ; 
s o m e b o d y ' s g o i n g to be h a p p y , s o m e b o d y ' s 
g o i n g to be u n h a p p y . T h a t ' s why I get p a i d 
the big b u c k s by the t a x p a y e r s . 
F o r t u n a t e l y , you h a v e c o m p e t e n t 
c o u n s e l w h o ' s i n d i c a t e d h e ' s p r o b a b l y g o i n g 
to let the a p p e l l a t e c o u r t take a look at 
what I did and we all may be b a c k in t h i s 
c o u r t r o o m w i t h me b e i n g v e r y c h a s t e n e d and 
h u m i l i a t e d by a c o u r t of a p p e a l s that says I 
made a m i s t a k e . But I can l i v e w i t h that I 
g u e s s . 
L e t s t a k e p r a c t i c a l l y w h a t w e ' r e g o i n g 
to do h e r e . Do y o u want to k e e p the t r i a l 
d a t e on in t h i s at the p r e s e n t time? It 
w o u l d g i v e y o u some t i m e to t h i n k a b o u t 
10 
1 w h e t h e r you w a n t to take it up and file y o u r 
2 p a p e r s ? If y o u file y o u r p a p e r s , you 
3 s t r i k e the t r i a l d a t e , and see what h a p p e n s ? 
4 MR. S H E E N : T h a t ' s c e r t a i i l y a g r e e a b l e 
5 to m e . I w o u l d m a k e that d e c i s i o n w i t h i n 
6 the n e x t day or t w o , say T u e s d a y . 
7 M R . B E L N A P : Y o u r H o n o r m a y b e you d o n ' t 
8 want to get i n t o t h i s b e c a u s e w e ' r e into 
9 the d u s t - s e t t 1 i n g s t a g e h e r e , w h i c h I 
10 u n d e r s t a n d . 
11 But if y o u l o o k at the c o m p l a i n t and 
12 the p r a y e r for r e l i e f , s u b p a r a g r a p h s A 
13 t h r o u g h D, w h i c h are all the p r a y e r s that 
14 are m a d e , A a s k s i n j u n c t i v e r e l i e f with 
15 r e s p e c t to the C C & R ' s . Y o u of d e a l t w i t h 
16 t h a t . 
17 B a s k s for a t t o r n e y s fees b e c a u s e of 
18 the d e r i v a t i v e a c t i o n , and t h a t ' s dealt w i t h 
19 by the r u l i n g on A. 
20 C asks for r e m o v a l of the d e f e n d a n t s as 
21 o f f i c e r s and t r u s t e e s and for the e l e c t i o n 
22 of new t r u s t e e s b e c a u s e of the a l l e g e d 
23 c o n d u c t in A. A n d t h a t ' s b e e n d e a l t w i t h . 
24 A n d D, s a y s as to all c a u s e s of a c t i o n 




























u n a u t h o r i z e d a c t s or in i s s u a n c e of 
m e m b e r s h i p c e r t i f i c a t e s and for d a m a g e s for 
r e c t i f y i n g p r i o r u n a u t h o r i z e d a c t s . 
W e ' l l s t i p u l a t e r i g h t n o w , 
y o u r H o n o r , that t h e s e p e o p l e h a v e b e e n 
o f f e r e d a m e m b e r s h i p c e r t i f i c a t e and w e ' l l 
s t i p u l a t e that an o r d e r can e n t e r . W e ' l l 
g i v e them o n e . 
THE C O U R T : O k a y h e r e ' s what I see as 
m a y b e the d r i v i n g i s s u e . If this is g o i n g 
u p , I d o n ' t w a n t it c o m i n g back on the 
g r o u n d s that all of the i s s u e s w e r e n ' t 
r e s o l v e d in s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t . 
M R . S H E E N : T h a t ' s c e r t a i n l y the f i r s t 
i s s u e I w o u l d r a i s e , y o u r H o n o r , b e c a u s e I 
r e a d d i f f e r e n t p a r t s of the c o m p l a i n t and 
w o u l d i n d i c a t e that t h e r e are o u t s t a n d i n g 
i s s u e s . 
THE C O U R T : And w e ' r e g o i n g to h a v e to 
w r e s t l e w i t h this b e c a u s e it's g o i n g to be a 
c r i t i c a l q u e s t i o n on a p p e a l . 
And if it goes up on a p p e a l f r o m a 
m o t i o n for a p a r t i a l s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t , w e ' r e 
g o i n g to have to go t h r o u g h all the 



























p r e r e q u i s i t e s to c e r t i f i c a t i o n . 
I've got to t h i n k y o u ' v e got to do 
that a n y w a y ; I f u l l y a p p r e c i a t e w h e r e y o u ' r e 
c o m i n g f r o m . 
M R . B E L N A P : I w o u l d just say your 
H o n o r , as a s u g g e s t i o n , if c o u n s e l b e l i e v e s 
that t h e r e are i s s u e s that have not b e e n 
d i s p o s e d of by t h i s c o u r t ' s r u l i n g , w e ' r e to 
s h o w up for t r i a l , and w i t h i n w h a t is f r a m e d 
in this c o m p l a i n t , if he c l a i m s t h e r e ' s 
i s s u e s that h a v e n ' t b e e n d i s p o s e d o f f , then 
we o u g h t to d i s p o s e of t h e m . W e ' r e two w e e k s 
a w a y from t r i a l . T h e n the w h o l e t h i n g ' s 
g o i n g u p . 
THE C O U R T : O k a y . Just a s e c o n d . Let 
m e - - I'm g o i n g to let you h a v e y o u r say on 
t h i s , but I want to f o l l o w up on t h i s . 
If we do t h a t , if we do t h a t , why 
s h o u l d n ' t we try and take an e x p a n s i v e v i e w 
of the a v a i l a b l e i s s u e s left to be t r i e d , 
r a t h e r than a n a r r o w v i e w ? 
At l e a s t if we do t h a t - - and I'm still 
g o i n g to let you tell me this w h o l e t h i n g ' s 
a bad idea — t h e r e are g o i n g to be f i n d i n g s 




























b u s i n e s s and that m i g h t be b e n e f i c i a l 
u l t i m a t e l y , I t h i n k . I d o n ' t k n o w . 
MR. S H E E N : I'm only t h i n k i n g a b o u t 
e c o n o m i e s , y o u r H o n o r , and I h a v e a d m i t t e d 
that y o u r d e c i s i o n has r e n d e r e d d i f f i c u l t 
the g u t s of this c a s e . I do n o t a g r e e w i t h 
M r . B e l n a p that now the e n t i r e case is g o n e . 
But it d o e s n ' t seem to m a k e sense 
u n l e s s w e ' r e g o i n g to do as the court 
s u g g e s t s w h i c h I g u e s s I'm o p e n to 
c o n s i d e r i n g . In o t h e r w o r d s , I g u e s s w e ' l l 
be m a k i n g a r e c o r d on a p p e a l in the e v e n t 
that the a p p e l l a t e c o u r t d i s a g r e e s w i t h the 
c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n on the m o t i o n for s u m m a r y 
j u d g m e n t . 
It s e e m s kind of an u n e c o n o m i c a l w e i g h 
of h a n d l i n g the s i t u a t i o n w h e n the c e n t r a l 
i s s u e I b e l i e v e will p r o b a b l y n e e d to be 
d e c i d e d by and a p p e l l a t e c o u r t . 
THE C O U R T : How are you p r e j u d i c e d if 
t h e r e are r e m a i n i n g i s s u e s and we d o n ' t try 
it on the 2 2 n d ? 
M R . B E L N A P : I can't t h i n k of a n y , 
o t h e r t h a n w e ' r e r e a d y , J u d g e , and, y o u 
k n o w , we n o w - - as M r . R i n g w o o d has 



























i n d i c a t e d , t h e r e ' s a n e w l y - e l e c t e d b o a r d in 
p l a c e . T h e s e p e o p l e n e e d to get on w i t h 
t h e i r l i v e s . J u d g e B r i a n d i r e c t e d at the 
time that he d e n i e d m j u r ^ t i v e r e l i e f , he 
s a i d , " y o u f o l k s need to get on, and you 
n e e d t o , y o u k n o w , f u n c t i o n and get a l o n g . " 
A n d s o , that w o u l d be the o n l y b a s i s 
We r e a l i z e y o u c a n n o t sit on the b e n c h and 
tell p e o p l e , " go get a l o n g , " and they 
a l w a y s W 3 1 1 do it That d o e s n ' t h a p p e n . But 
b r i n g i n g the m a t t e r to a c o n c l u s i o n will 
a s s i s t us in d o i n g t h a t . 
But we s t i l l come b a c k to I t h i n k k i n d 
of a f u n d a m e n t a l p r o c e d u r a l q u e s t i o n , anci 
that i s : Is the a p p e a l g o i n g to be an a p p e a l 
from a g r a n t of a m o t i o n for p a r t i a l s u m m a r y 
j u d g m e n t or is the a p p e a l f r o m a g r a n t of 
s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t that r e s o l v e s all of the 
i s s u e s m the c a s e 9 
THE C O U R T I g u e s s i t ' s Mr S h e e n 
t h a t ' s p r o b a b l y g o i n g to h a v e to take the 
f i r s t c r a c k at it I'm t r y i n g to think how 
w e ' r e g o i n g to do this Or you can a r g u e 
the i s s u e s I g u e s s 




























that what w e ' r e t a l k i n g a b o u t h e r e — w h e n you 
asked me h o w are we p r e j u d i c e d , aij I 
i n d i c a t e d I c o u l d n ' t t h i n k of a n y , o t h e r 
than what I i n d i c a t e d - - that it is a c l e a n e r 
r e c o r d to go up on p a r t i a l s u m m a r y 
j u d g m e n t a n d get that r e s o l v e d ? W h i c h 
h a n d l e s w h a t M r . S h e e n calls the g u t s of the 
the case a n y w a y , a n d m a y b e t h a t ' s c o r r e c t . 
It's j u s t w h e n you get this c l o s e an 
then in our viev this r u l i n g d i s p o s e s of the 
c a s e , a n t h e r e ' s a d i f f e r e n c e of o p i n i o n on 
that* I d o n ' t k n o w that w e ' r e g o i n g to be 
able to c o n v i n c e each o t h e r ' s c o u n s e l of 
t h a t . So m a y b e we o u g h t to go up on the 
p a r t i a l s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t . 
THE C O U R T : I c e r t a i n l y w o u l d - - I g u e s s 
I w o u l d be s y m p a t h e t i c to m a k i n g the r u l i n g s 
a p p r o p r i a t e to get it up on p a r t i a l s u m m a r y 
j u d g m e n t b e c a u s e it c e r t a i n l y m a k e s s e n s e to 
do it that vOA^ * 
MR. S H E E N : C o u l d I d r a f t the form o f - -
b a s i c a l l y of o r d e r and h a v e it a p p r o v e d as 
to form in t h a t v e i n ? 
THE C O U R T : Y e s . 
MR. B E L N A P : We w o u l d l i k e the 
0 4 h l 
1 6 
1 o p p o r t u n i t y , if it's a c c e p t a b l e , to d r a f t 
2 f i n d i n g s a ru^  c o n c l u s i o n s s u p p o r t i n g y o u r 
3 p a r t i a l s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t . If c o u n s e l w a n t s 
4 to do a 54 B c e r t i f i c a t i o n , we w o u l d like to 
5 l o o k a t t h a t . 
S THE C O U R T : I t h i n k t h a t ' s a good i d e a , 
7 b e c a u s e I w o u l d like to h a v e the C o u r t of 
8 A p p e a l s h a v e a c l e a r shot at m e , anj you 
9 k n o w , if I m a d e a m i s t a k e I want them to 
10 k n o w - - I w a n t to k n o w e x a c t l y what it 1 s . u 
11 An so I c o n c u r w i t h t h a t . Lets go that 
1 2 felRV\. 
13 MR . S H E E N : Okay . 
14 THE C O U R T : G e n t l e m e n , l e t s - - b e f o r e 
15 you a d j o u r n , let me t h a n k y o u . B o t h the 
16 p a p e r s w e r e v e r y w e l l p r e p a r e d , the case was 
17 w e l l a r g u e d . G o o d job all the way a r o u n d , 
18 anj this w o n ' t be the end of i t . 
19 MR. S H E E N : T h a n k y o u , y o u r H o n o r . 
20 MR. B E L N A P : T h a n k y o u , your H o n o r . 
21 ( W h e r e u p o n , the i n s t a n t p r o c e e d i n g s . 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
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JO ANN VINCENT, KEN FISHER, DIANE 
DUPLANTY, RON DUPLANTY, JAN 
NEMCIK, BECKY NELSON, ROSIE 
PETRONELL, CORY ALSBERG, GERALD 
VINCENT, SANDY FISHER, SCOTT 
FEATHERSTONE, MARTIN ROGUSCHKA) 
LANCE SWEDISH, LAUREL KANGAS, 
JOHN DOES 1-5, JANE DOES 1-5, and 
HIGHLAND ESTATES PROPERTIES 
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC, 
Defendants 
ORDER AND RULE 54(b) 
CERTIFICATION 
Civil No 970300011 
Judge Pat Brian 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 7th day of October, 1998 on 
plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider, with counsel of record for plaintiff appearing and counsel of 
record for defendant appearing 
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The matter was argued to the Court and the Court being fully advised by counsel 
concerning the issues involved, the Court made its ruling denying the plaintiffs motion. The 
Court deems it appropriate to set forth the basis of this ruling as follows: 
1. At the time the summary judgment hearing was argued and presented to Judge 
Nehring, the above-entitled matter was scheduled to proceed to trial in less than two weeks 
thereafter. 
2. At the time of the summary judgment hearing, plaintiff did not request leave for 
additional discovery or indicate that the matter was not ripe for decision at that juncture in the 
case. 
3. This Court finds that the documents which plaintiff attempts to now rely upon for 
their Motion to Reconsider, procedurally are not appropriate to be submitted at this juncture of 
the case. If plaintiff felt that the documents were potentially significant or important, plaintiff was 
aware of the potential existence of the same, and of defendant's objection to production of the 
documents for reasons stated in discovery responses. Plaintiff made no motion to compel the 
production of the documents tendered to the court with the Motion to Reconsider and it is 
undisputed that the evidence plaintiff now attempts to tender to the court with the Motion to 
Reconsider was in fact available to be requested, to seek an order compelling the same, or to seek 
leave from the court to have additional time to review the matter before the case was presented to 
Judge Nehring for summary judgment argument just prior to the scheduled trial of the case. 
Therefore, this court finds that procedurally the plaintiff had fair opportunity to conduct and 
complete such discovery as plaintiffs felt necessary and appropriate or to compel production of 
2 
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such documents as plaintiffs felt appropriate. Plaintiffs' failure to do so constitutes a waiver of 
the basis on which plaintiffs now seek reconsideration and procedurally there is no basis to set 
aside the order of the Honorable Ronald E. Nehring granting the defendant summary judgment. 
Following the ruling of the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider, counsel 
addressed to the Court the issues surrounding the status of the case and plaintiffs' desire to have 
the ruling of Judge Nehring reviewed by an appellate court. Based upon the arguments of 
counsel, the agreement of counsel and this court's review of this matter, it is determined by this 
Court and this Court so finds that there is not just reason for delay and the order of the Honorable 
Ronald E. Nehring is hereby certified pursuant to Rule 54(b) for entry as a final Order and 
judgment. It is the opinion of this Court, and counsel also have represented to this Court that it 
was the opinion of Judge Nehring that it would be prudent to certify this order pursuant to Rule 
54(b) since the ruling on the summary judgment substantially resolves the determinative issues in 
the above-entitled action and if plaintiff chooses to appeal from the same, it would be a substantial 
savings of judicial resources to have that appeal proceed now rather than proceeding through a 
trial and then a subsequent appeal 
WHEREFORE, based upon the reasons set forth above, it is 
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. That Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider is hereby denied. 
2. The Court certifies the Order of the Honorable Ronald E. Nehring dated May 28. 
1998 as a final Order and Judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b), this Court determining that there is 
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no just reason for delay and that a judgment should enter pursuant to said order 
T^ t u day or©ee@fflfe©j DATED this  ofS eejf er, 1998 
BY THE COURT 
,7 
Approved as to Form 
Pa i^ Jbnan 
Third District Court Judge I | c,:. /* 
\?*fe"» t tV? 
X 
E Jay Sheen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
. * « f ^ f l /W n O n a^it^iw 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this/Vy day of December, 1998, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Order and Rule 54(b) Certification was mailed, first class postage prepaid, to: 
E. Jay Sheen 
ROBINSON & SHEEN 
77 West 200 South, Suite 420 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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APPENDIX E 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
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BILLINGS, Judge: 
fl Plaintiffs, homeowners in the Highland Estates subdivision 
and members of the Highland Estates Property Owners Association 
(Association), brought this action against the members of the 
Association's board of trustees (Trustees). Plaintiffs sought to 
have the trial court set aside certain changes to the covenants, 
conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs) that the Association 
recorded in 1995 and that amended and replaced previously filed 
CC&Rs. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Trustees 
and Plaintiffs appeal. We reverse. 
FACTS 
%2 The original CC&Rs for the Highland Estates subdivision were 
filed on July 6, 1964, in Summit County, Utah, and amended CC&Rs 
were filed on March 14, 1972 (the 1972 CC&Rs). The Association 
was incorporated under the Utah Nonprofit Corporation Act in 
October of 1972. 
1173 
1|3 In 1993, the Trustees of the Association determined that the 
1972 CC&Rs required updating and revision. The Trustees had 
their counsel draft a new set of revised CC&Rs, which were 
presented to the members attending the Association's June 1994 
annual meeting. 
%A Although all of the approximately forty homeowners in 
attendance at the meeting voted in favor of the new CC&Rs, the 
Trustees could not obtain the required vote of the owners of a 
majority of the subdivision lots at the meeting. The Trustees 
decided that a mail-in ballot would be the best way to notify the 
homeowners in the subdivision and maximize participation in the 
election. 
if5 In August 1994, the Association's attorney prepared a letter 
addressed to each member of the Association that contained a copy 
of the proposed amended CC&Rs and a ballot. The letter stated, 
"the voting period expires November 30, 19 94; ballots must be 
returned by that date." However, the Trustees had not received 
all of the:"ballots by that date and therefore extended the voting 
period. The Association's January 1995 newsletter informed the 
homeowners "that^the voting period had been extended, and 
encouragedleverybody to mail in a ballot. 
1J6 The Association held its next annual meeting on September 
25, 1995, when it was announced that the amended CC&Rs had been 
approved by mail-in ballot, that the ballots would be verified, 
and that the CC&Rs would be recorded with the county. The final 
vote was 14 9 in favor of the CC&Rs, 2 6 opposed, and 87 abstaining 
(about 57% of the 262 lot owners voted in favor of the amended 
CC&Rs). Plaintiffs did not complain about nor comment on either 
the mail-in balloting procedure or the CC&Rs until the CC&Rs had 
been recorded by the Trustees. 
%7 Plaintiffs filed their complaint on January 21, 1997. The 
Trustees filed a motion for summary judgment on November 26, 
1997.x The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the 
Trustees on May 28, 1998. 
%8 Following entry of summary judgment for the Trustees, 
Plaintiffs obtained the ballots cast by the homeowners and also 
procured affidavits from other Highland Estates homeowners 
stating that they did not receive notice of the balloting. 
Plaintiffs presented this information to the trial court in a 
Rule 60(b) motion to reconsider summary judgment. See Utah R. 
Civ. P. 60(b). On March 3, 1999, the trial court denied 
1. Plaintiffs did not file a cross motion for summary judgment. 
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Plaintiffs1 motion to reconsider and certified the court's May 
28, 1998 order as a final order and judgment. 
%9 Plaintiffs now appeal both the summary judgment and the 
denial of their motion to reconsider.2 
ANALYSIS 
UlO The trial court concluded as a matter of law "that the mail-
in ballot voting procedure substantially complied with the Bylaws 
and [CC&Rs] in place and that no prejudice to the homeowners of 
Highland Estates occurred as a result of mail-in balloting." 
Plaintiffs argue the amended CC&Rs are ineffectual because mail-
in balloting is prohibited by the Utah Nonprofit Corporations 
statute and the Association's by-laws. 
Standard of Review 
Ull "'The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, 
which we review for correctness.'" Provo City v. Cannon, 1999 UT 
App 344, %5f 383 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (citations omitted). In 
addition to the statute under which a corporation is formed, a 
corporation's articles of incorporation and by-laws constitute a 
contract between the corporation and its members. See Workman v. 
Brighton Properties., Inc., 1999 UT 30, 1l0, 976 P.2d 1209 
(citing Turner v. Hi-Country Homeowners Ass'n, 910 P.2d 1223, 
1225 (Utah 1996)). Interpretation of contracts is likewise a 
question of law we review for"correctness. See Nova Cas. Co. v. 
Able Constr. , Inc., 1999 UT 69, f6, 983 P.2d 575.3 
2. Because we reverse the grant of summary judgment, we need not 
reach the issue of whether the motion to reconsider was properly 
denied. 
3. The Trustees argue that we should review their decision to 
use mail-in balloting under the business judgment rule. However, 
we find no support in Utah case law for the proposition that a 
corporation's adherence to required procedure, as opposed to its 
substantive decisions, is entitled to such deferential review. 
Rather, our case law indicates that the propriety of the 
Trustees' acts presents a question of law and that we should 
employ the usual rules of statutory and contract interpretation. 




Required Voting Procedure 
Hl2 Plaintiffs argue the Trustees could only modify the CC&Rs 
through a duly called meeting of the members of the Association. 
We agree. 
Ul3 The 1972 CC&Rs, which the Trustees purported to amend 
through the mail-in balloting process now at issue, provide for 
amendment by vote of owners holding a majority of the lots in the 
subdivision, but do not specify a voting procedure.4 However, by 
incorporating into a homeowners association, the homeowners bound 
themselves to the requirements of Utah's Nonprofit Corporations 
statute. See, e.cr. , Village of Brown Deer v. City of Milwaukee, 
114 N.W.2d 493, 497 (Wise. 1962) (requiring corporation to follow 
statutory procedures for action in absence of directors1 meeting 
and noting: "Those who would enjoy the benefits that attend the 
corporate form of operation are obliged to conduct their affairs 
in accordance with the laws which authorize them."). 
Hl4 Generally, the shareholders of a corporation "have no power 
to act as or for the corporation except at a corporate meeting 
called and conducted according to law except in those 
jurisdictions that specifically provide for corporate action by 
shareholders without a meeting." W. Fletcher, 5 Cyclopedia of 
the Law of Private Corporations, § 1996 (1996). Utah adopted 
this general rule in its Nonprofit Corporation Act (Act). Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 16-1-1 to -124(5) (1999). The Act calls for action 
by members of the corporation at either annual or special 
meetings of members, see id. § 16-6-27, at which members may vote 
in person or by proxy. See id. § 16-6-30 (permitting voting by 
proxy if not prohibited by articles of incorporation or by-laws 
of corporation) . Action by the members in the absence of a 
meeting requires unanimous written consent by the members. See 
id. § 16-6-33. That is, 
Any action required by this acu to be taken 
at a meeting of the members . . . of a 
4. The 1972 CC&Rs provide: 
These Conditions shall run with the land and 
shall be binding upon all parties and all 
persons claiming under them until March 10, 
1982, at which time said Conditions and 
Covenants shall be automatically extended for 
successive periods of ten (10) years, unless 
by vote of the owners of a majority of the 
lots in said Subdivision, it is agreed to 
change said Conditions in whole or in part. 
990301-CA 4 
nonprofit corporation, or any action which 
may be taken at a meeting of the members 
. . . may be taken without a meeting if a 
consent in writing, setting forth the action 
so taken, shall be signed by all of the 
members entitled to vote with respect to the 
subject matter thereof.5 
Ul5 It is undisputed that the Trustees received only 175 total 
ballots and only 149 ballots in favor of the revised CC&Rs. The 
Trustees therefore lacked unanimous written consent to amend the 
1972 CC&Rs in the absence of a shareholders meeting. The 
Trustees therefore did not strictly comply with the Act's 
requirement of unanimous written consent. 
Kl6 Nor did the Trustees comply with the voting procedures 
specified by the Association's by-laws. The Association's by-
laws contemplate action taken only at a duly constituted meeting. 
For example, Section 2.5 of the by-laws, titled "Voting 
Requirements," provides: "When a quorum is present in person or 
represented by proxy at any meeting, the vote of a majority of 
the membership present in person or by proxy shall decide any 
question brought before such meeting. . . . All votes may be 
cast be the members either in person or by proxy." (Emphasis 
added.) It is clear that the trustees did not comply with the 
voting procedures required by the Act and by their own by-laws. 
See Reedeker v. Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577, 582 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 
("[B]ecause the Association is a corporation, it may not act in 
any way not authorized in its . . . articles of incorporation or 
bylaws." (citations omitted)); National Dev. Co. Inc. v. 
Trusteeship of Woodland Lakes, 643 F. Supp. 561, 563 (E.D. Mo. 
1986) (holding only votes taken in compliance with corporate 
constitution and by-laws binding). 
i[l7 The Trustees argue, and the trial court concluded, that they 
substantially complied with the statutory and by-law voting 
requirements. However, we have stated: 
When determining whether substantial 
statutory compliance as opposed to strict 
statutory compliance should be permitted, we 
must . . . ascertain whether full protection 
under the statute would still be enjoyed by 
the party the statute seeks to protect. If 
5. Defendants somehow construe this section to require unanimous 
written consent only if the action to be taken is amendment of 
the articles of incorporation. We do not understand how 
defendants arrive at that conclusion. 
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"substantial . . . compliance satisfies the 
policy of the statute [,]" then strict 
compliance is not in order. 
Badger v. Madsen, 896 P.2d 20, 23 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (citations 
omitted). Badger involved a nonprofit corporation's compliance 
with Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-61 (1991). See id. at 21-22. Section 
16-6-61 requires that a nonprofit corporation intending to 
encumber substantially all of its assets provide notice that a 
vote on that issue will be taken at the meeting. See id. at 22-
23. Because the notice provision was intended to protect the 
shareholders1 rights, we required strict compliance. See id. at 
23. 
Hl8 We conclude the present case raises the same concerns. The 
Act's requirement that Association members act only at a duly 
called meeting protects the rights of the members and is 
therefore for their benefit. See id. The Association included a 
similar protection in its by-laws, which, like the Act, 
contemplate actions taken only at a duly constituted meeting of 
Association members. That by-law, like the Act, protects the 
Association's members by requiring that member actions be taken 
at member meetings where free discussion and dissent can be 
heard. Absent a meeting, the homeowners' consent must be 
unanimous. 
fl9 We conclude that, because the voting procedures protect the 
members' interests, they are mandatory rather than directory and 
therefore strict compliance is required. * Because the mail-in 
balloting procedure did not comply strictly with either the Act 
or the Association's by-laws, we conclude it was ineffectual. 
Waiver 
f20 The Trustees argue that, even if mail-in balloting did not 
comply with required procedures, we should uphold summary 
judgment for defendants because Plaintiffs waived their 
objections to the mail-in balloting procedure. The Trustees 
argue that Plaintiffs waived their objections to procedural 
irregularities because, although Plaintiffs had full knowledge of 
the mail-in balloting procedure, Plaintiffs made no objection to 
the procedure until after the amended CC&Rs were recorded. 
^21 The Trustees base their argument on Section 2.8 of the by-
laws, which provides: 
All inaccuracies and/or irregularities in 
calls, notices of meeting and in the manner 
of voting, form of proxies, credentials and 
method of ascertaining those present, shall 
990301-CA 6 
be deemed waived if no objection is made at 
the meeting. 
(Emphasis added.) This by-law plainly applies to waiver of 
procedural irregularities at a duly convened meeting. This 
provision thus does not apply where no meeting is convened and 
the lack of a meeting forms the basis of Plaintiffs1 complaint. 
1(22 Furthermore, the Trustees cite no authority for their 
proposition that a member of a corporation waives an objection to 
the manner of voting where the voting was not conducted at a duly 
called meeting. Our independent research has found no case in 
which a plaintiff was held to have waived a claim where proxies 
were not presented at a meeting,6 nor where fewer than the 
required written consents were obtained for action without a 
meeting.7 We therefore conclude that Plaintiffs did not waive 
their objections. 
CONCLUSION 
1[23 The statutory and by-law provisions requiring that action by 
members of a nonprofit corporation be taken only at a duly 
convened meeting protect the interests of the members of the 
association; strict compliance with these provisions is therefore 
required. Because the mail-in balloting procedure did not comply 
strictly with the Utah Nonprofit Corporations Act or the 
Association's by-laws, the procedure was ineffectual and summary 
judgment for the Trustees was error. Furthermore, Plaintiffs did 
6. This court has said that "when shareholders attend and 
participate in a meeting, either in person or by proxy, they 
cannot later claim that any action taken at the meeting was 
invalid because of improper notice." Badger, 896 P.2d at 24. 
However, we have found no case where mail-in ballots were counted 
in the absence of a meeting called for the purpose of an 
election. A finding of waiver in this case would therefore be 
without precedent. 
7. On the contrary, courts set aside the actions of a 
corporation where the required written consents were not 
obtained. See, e.g., Barsam v. Pure Tech Int1!, Inc., 864 P. 
Supp. 1440, 1452-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (setting aside amendment to 
corporation by-laws where written consents were obtained from 
only 57 percent of shareholders but by-law required 100 percent 
and statute required 67 percent). 
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not waive their objections to the mail-in voting procedure. We 
therefore reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge^ 
H24 WE CONCUR: 
.^u«^ 
Nodhnan H. Jackso^ 
Associate Presiding Judge 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
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1 PARK CITY, UTAH; WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 2001, 1:30 P.M. 
2 -oooOooo-
3 THE COURT: What we need today? Mr. Robinson? 
4 MR. ROBINSON: Let's see, Your Honor. I 
5 appreciate the opportunity to address the Court. I think 
6 all -- as I understand it, we're just here to establish the 
7 reasonableness of the fees --
8 I THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. ROBINSON: -- charged to the plaintiffs. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 









THE COURT: Well, I think we'd be better off that 
way but, of course, if Mr. Belnap wants to challenge that, 
as heTs entitled to cross-examine, as you would be the 
witness he had. "Did you get the Court's ruling on that 
17 I expedited motion? 
18 I MR. ROBINSON: We did, Your Honor, and we've 
received that summary billing. 
THE COURT: Good. Was that any help for your 
purposes? I mean, that's as far as I was prepared to go 






24 | MR. ROBINSON: I think -- well, again, depending 





























Q. Okay. I guess I'd want to ask Mr. Wright if 
ever bills over $110. Do you know? 
A. I don't think so. 
Q. But do you know? 
A. I do. 
i Q. Okay. So you're not just thinking; you know 
never billed for higher than $110 an hour. 
A. Not that I know of. 
Q. Okay. 
MR. ROBINSON: Okay. That's all I have. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
he 
he ' s 
Do you have anything else to offer in terms of 
witnesses or proffer at this time? 
MR. ROBINSON: No. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Belnap? 
MR. BELNAP: Your Honor, with the plaintiff 
resting, I have some motions that I'd like to bring at 
time. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
this 
MR. BELNAP: Your Honor, at this time, the defense 
would like to move for a directed verdict on the issue 
that's before you on attorneys fees in this trial, and 
basis for that motion would be as follows, Your Honor. 
the 
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1 It is our position that it is clear, under Utah 
2 law, that there has to be a threshold showing of legal 
3 entitlement to attorneys fees. It is simply not sufficient 
4 to say that the fees were reasonable or necessary. That's 
5 one of the components, if you pass the threshold question of 
6 legal entitlement. But there has been a void, a failure, a 
7 complete lack of evidence on legal entitlement. There's 
8 been nothing put before the Court in the plaintiffs' case on 
9 legal entitlement. 
10 I would say to the Court that Rule 23.1 of the 
11 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, on derivative actions, 
12 indicates, and I quote in part. Quote: "The derivative 
13 action may not be maintained if it appears the plaintiff 
14 does not fairly and adequately represent the interests of 
15 the shareholders or members similarly situated in enforcing 
16 the right of the corporation or association." 
17 THE COURT: Now, that's your standing argument, 
18 correct, on the --
19 MR. BELNAP: That is, but --
20 THE COURT: And I'm just a little -- I've been 
21 wondering about that ever since you mentioned it earlier in 
22 the context of what the Court of Appeals ruled on. Is it a 
23 different standing requirement or threshold requirement for 
24 what they determined in terms of the vote to amend, or are 
25 you saying it was just never raised and it's not too late to 
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1 raise it now? I'm a little confused since we had that 
2 ruling from the Court of Appeals. But it's a dead issue --
3 MR. BELNAP: Well, you'll remember, Your Honor, 
4 and that's why I started where I did this afternoon with 
5 confirming on the record that there are no issues left to be 
6 decided from the plaintiffs' perspective. Because what went 
7 up to the Court of Appeals was a 54 (b) certification on the 
8 summary judgment on the question of: Was the mail-in ballot 
9 procedure substantially complying with the provisions of the 
10 corporate — the Non-profit Corporation Act? That was the 
11 issue that went up to the Court of Appeals. 
12 We filed a motion before Judge Nehring on the 
13 standing issue at the same time as we filed the motion on 
14 the --on the other claims. We filed it also on standing. 
15 And Judge Nehring said the following in his order. This is 
16 his order of May 28th, 1998. 
17 "Based upon the record before the Court, there are 
18 
19 insufficient facts and insufficient grounds to, as a matter 
20 of law, to determine that the plaintiffs are inappropriate 
21 parties to bring this action." End of quote. He simply 
22 indicated that that was a question that would have to be 
23 sorted out factually. 
24 Now, that question becomes at issue in this case, 
25 in our opinion, because it's a threshold requirement. That 
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they -- they are claiming to be in the position of 
representing all of the home owners as a whole under that 
derivative action status, and they have to make a showing 
that they are, and they have not, Judge. 
Now, with respect to the caselaw dealing with this 
legal entitlement issue, I would again reference the Court 
to the Stewart case. This was a case from our Supreme Court 
in 1994, and they indicated this is the first time we have 
ever departed from the American rule in terms of -- of 
saying that you can get fees in this kind of a situation. 
And so they said, certainly, there is a legal entitlement 
requirement to be shown. And they said that very plainly 
when they said the general rule in Utah and the traditional 
American rule, subject to exceptions, is that attorneys fees 
cannot be recovered by a prevailing party unless a statute 
or contract authorizes such. 
So there has to be a showing. There's not a 
statute, there's not a contract. They then have to show we 
fall into one of the legal exceptions. And in my -- and in 
our view, Judge, this is not a pure question of law. This 
is a factual inquiry when you start talking about 
substantial benefit. It's clearly a factual inquiry if you 
look at the cases, all of the cases. Whether they're in 
Utah or not. When you look at the common fund cases, it is 
a factual inquiry. In dealing with this court exercising 
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1 its inheritable -- excuse me, it's inherent equitable power 
2 and those examples the court gave in Stewart of where 
3 they've allowed it, vexatious, bad-faith litigation, class 
4 actions because of common fund, private attorney general 
5 actions, and then they said, "We're going to allow it here." 
6 But I think it's important, if you look at this 
7 case, how closely our courts look at it straying from the 
8 American rule when there's not been a showing, when they 
9 said in footnote 19: "In holding that the private attorney 
10 general doctrine applies here" -- and that's what they 
H decided, that those people that had brought the action 
12 against USWest stood in the shoes of a private attorney 
13 general -- "We note the exceptional nature of this case. We 
14 further note that any future award of attorneys fees under 
15 this doctrine will take an equally extraordinary case." 
15 So they don't just say you plop into that -- that 
17 groove just automatically, Judge. 
18 The following case that followed Stewart was this 
19 Barker case, when the court reviewed the amount of the fees 
20 that were awarded because of that. And the court in Barker 
21 specifically said that the determination that they used in 
22 this common fund case -- which we don't have here -- was to 
23 avoid the unjust enrichment of those who benefit from the 
24 fund that is created by those who don't bear the costs. 
25 To me, that's, once again, if they want to -- if 
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1 they want to urge the Court that this is a substantial 
2 benefit case, which is what their legal arguments have been 
3 to the Court, there has to be a factual showing of where is 
4 that substantial benefit after you've crossed the first 
5 threshold I mentioned of standing, Your Honor, and that's 
6 our motion. 
7 MR. ROBINSON: Your Honor, I'm going to defer to 
8 Mr. Sheen on these issues. 
9 THE COURT: That's fine. 
10 MR- SHEEN: Your Honor, I must admit I remain 
11 confused on the standing argument. They raise the issue of 
12 standing prior to trial in their motion for summary 
13 judgment. One of their motions was: Move for summary 
14 judgment this case should be dismissed on the basis of the 
15 lack of standing. And the court, with the evidence in the 
16 summary judgment, taking all of the evidence at hand, said, 
17 "Motion denied." 
18 THE COURT: Are we referring to the same ruling, 
19 Judge Nehring's --
20 MR. SHEEN: We are. Judge Nehring's ruling. 
21 MR. ROBINSON: Can I present you a copy of that? 
22 I THE COURT: Please, uh-huh. 
MR. SHEEN: I was referring, Judge, to this -- to 
the conclusions there. 
23 
24 
25 THE COURT: Okay. 
84 
1 MR. SHEEN: Obviously, the essence of that hearing 
2 was the standing of the plaintiffs in this action, and that 
3 was the vast majority of the evidence that was elicited. 
4 It's in the record in this matter. It's in the case. 
5 We appealed our portion of the summary judgment 
6 motion, where the motion for -- was granted in that there 
7 wasn't a sufficient basis for us to proceed, not on the 
8 issue of standing, which was denied. They did not appeal 
9 that motion -- the denial of that motion on appeal. And the 
10 Court of Appeals accepted that appeal on the basis that this 
11 was a derivative action. We're sitting here today as a 
12 derivative action. 
13 THE COURT: Well, that being my nagging question. 
14 Does the Court of Appeals impliedly find there is standing 
15 to address this other issue? 
16 MR. SHEEN: Well, the Court doesn't have to find 
17 that. No one disputed that there was standing at that point 
18 in time. The standing now comes up at this late date again, 
19 and the standing --
20 THE COURT: Well, depends on if the appeal was for 
21 everything or whether it was in fact some kind of partial. 
22 Mr. Belnap says it was a 54(b) certification. 
23 MR. SHEEN: It was a 54(b) certification. 
24 THE COURT: So what was remaining in terms -- what 
25 do people think still hadn't been resolved? 
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1 MR. SHEEN: Well, we were unsure as to whether 
2 there would be legitimate substantive material issues on 
3 issues like the failure to -- to prepare and keep a 
4 shareholders list, the failure to issue membership 
5 certificates. Those all became, essentially, minor and moot 
6 items. Those were the items that were left out. And, in 
7 fact, the record again is very clear that the parties, on 
8 the record in front of the court -- this is now Judge 
9 Brian -- indicated to him, both of us again, that, 
10 basically, this would take care of the case and it was the 
11 reason that it needed to be on appeal, is that this would 
12 basically take care of the case. It wasn't felt there were 
13 any other issues. 
14 Now, today, at the beginning of this hearing we 
15 stipulated, along with counsel for the defendants, that 
16 there were no other issues; we were here to talk about the 
17 form of the order, and today specifically, the 
18 reasonableness of the attorneys fees. Now he's saying 
19 there's an issue of standing that has never been decided. 
20 He stipulated at the beginning of this hearing that there 
21 wasn't any other issues to be decided in this case, that it 
22 was over and that we could move on to these other issues. 
23 THE COURT: I guess that depends on how you can --
24 how you interpret the stipulation. If you interpret it: Do 
25 you contend there has to be any more findings by the Court 
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1 before this is completely resolved, and you say there are 
2 not. Mr. Belnap then says, "Well, we have never had a 
3 factual examination on standing which was, in a sense, 
4 reserved by Judge Nehring." I don't know if that's true. 
5 This is quite novel. 
6 MR. SHEEN: Well, it wasn't reserved by Judge 
7 Nehring. He denied their motion to get rid of the case on 
8 the basis of standing. 
9 THE COURT: Yeah. He basically granted the 
10 motion, but only on one ground. 
11 MR. SHEEN: Yeah. And, granted, the order may be 
12 inartfully worded; that is, when it says there is -- you 
13 know, "I find there is not a -- a sufficient evidence to 
14 invalidate these parties as -- as derivative plaintiffs, 
15 proper derivative plaintiffs." That's exactly what he's 
16 finding, that they are derivative plaintiffs. We all 
17 perceived it on that basis from that point forward. There 
18 was never any attempt for any of the motions to reconsider 
19 on the appeal or here today, until this procedural motion 
20 for directed verdict comes up. That there's a question of 
21 the standing of these plaintiffs. That was fully argued and 
22 litigated in that motion for summary judgment. The facts 
23 are in the record. And the facts are there and they're a 
24 proper party. 
25 The fact that Judge Nehring said, "I can't find 
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that they're improper parties" --
THE COURT: But he didn't find they were proper 
either. He really did leave a bit of a limbo there, but I 
don't know if it makes a difference at this point. 
MR. SHEEN: I don't think it does make a 
difference at this point. And, frankly, I think his wording 
in the negative simply affirms the positive, they are proper 
parties. They tried everything they could in the motion for 
summary judgment to get it dismissed on that basis. The 
court said, "You haven't elicited enough evidence." And, 
remember, based on their same description of the status of 
the case at that point, all discovery had been done and we 
were ready to go to trial. There was nothing further they 
were going to be able to offer to convince the judge that --
that these people did have standing. All the arguments he's 
raised here today about economic controversy between the 
parties, that there is antagonism, economic antagonism, was 
all raised in that hearing before Judge Nehring. There's 
nothing new to offer on that point. That's the standing 
order. 
As for the substantial benefit, Your Honor, I 
think the argument being raised there is there were no facts 
elicited in this hearing about what the substantial benefit 
was. Well, the record is replete and it's on the record. 
And the Court of Appeals decision is public knowledge, and 
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1 the Court can take judicial notice of that. And the fact is 
2 that we've relied on that all along and continue to rely on 
3 that. The fact is we won at the Court of Appeals level and 
4 we won validating a substantial members' right --
5 THE COURT: Well, just a minute. You could win 
6 legally but not confer a benefit; isn't that true? 
7 MR. SHEEN: Yes, you could. And we're arguing 
8 that that was a substantial benefit. The right to allow 
9 members to cast an informed vote is a substantial benefit. 
10 Now, to put that in somebody's mouth, if we need 
11 to, we can certainly put that in somebody's mouth, that is 
12 that the Court of Appeals -- the decision of the Court of 
13 Appeals validated a member's fundamental right to vote is in 
14 the statutory scheme. But that's in the appeal opinion. In 
15 fact, we quote that in our refined memorandum. The language 
16 is very clear. This is vindication of a member!s right to 
17 open, active participation in the association that they're a 
18 member of, that they have an ownership interest in. That's 
19 right in the Court of Appeals opinion. I don't know who 
20 could say it better than that. I can refer you to that 
21 language, if you need, Your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: What I do need you to do, and I 
23 apologize for this, is to refer me -- or identify for me 
24 your specific argument for legal entitlement to fees. 
25 MR. SHEEN: Okay. 
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THE COURT: 
fresh on it right now 
MR. SHEEN: 
And I'm sure it's in here, but I'm not 
• 
Let's see. And, unfortunately, it may 
not be in my reply, Your Honor. It may be -- I may have 
been looking in the --no, it's in my reply at page 5. I 
don't know if you have that right here in front of you. 
THE COURT: 
just tell me about it 
MR. SHEEN: 
I can hand it to you, 
THE COURT: 
MR. SHEEN: 
No. Now that I'll find it quickly, 
1 
Page 5, let me read it to you and then 
if you'd like to read it yourself. 1 
Uh-huh. 
The Utah Court of Appeals in its 
written --in its written opinion says: "The Act's 
requirement that association members, at only a duly called 











rights of the members and is, 
Jay, can you let me catch up to you? 
I'm sorry. 
Where are you? 




So you've got that first -- first 
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1 line --or that first sentence in mind. 
2 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
3 MR. SHEEN: "...is, therefore, for their benefit. 
4 The Association included a similar protection in its by-laws 
5 which, like the Act, contemplate actions taken only at a 
6 duly constituted meeting of Association members. That by-
7 law, like the Act, protects the Association members by 
8 requiring that member action be taken at member meetings, 
9 where a free discussion of dissent can be heard." 
10 And in fact, I cite a number of cases, and there 
11 are a number of other cases -- these were cases that seemed 
12 to apply directly in this case -- in the reply memorandum in 
13 which I indicate that, exactly as in the Court of Appeals 
14 opinion, for example in the WalMart case, the Amalgamated 
15 Clothing v. WalMart, what happens there is people claimed 
16 that the proxy process is flawed. Well, WalMart says, 90 
17 percent of it -- we know what 90 percent of the votes are 
18 going to be, so it doesn't have any practical effect on the 
19 result. 
20 And the court holds that it is a substantial 
21 benefit just to allow the shareholders to render their 
22 informed vote, whether the outcome is dictated by how the 
23 shareholders already know they're going to vote or not. 
24 And so the Court of Appeals, in as clear a 
25 language as we need, indicates that vindication of this 
91 
1 fundamental right of membership participation is a 
2 substantial benefit. They indicate that's a protection that 
3 the statute allows, that this has been --
4 THE COURT: And does the caselaw always give a 
5 right to fees if a substantial benefit is conferred or 
6 received, or is that just one requirement? In a derivative. 
7 MR. SHEEN: Well, the reason, I think, that this 
8 was brought as a motion for a directed verdict is because it 
9 is probably a preliminary requirement. In other words, in 
10 common fund cases, you have a common fund from which to pay 
11 the fees. 
12 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
13 MR. SHEEN: But in substantial benefit cases, you 
14 then come to argue there wasn't a fund created from which 
15 you can pay the fees, but if there was a substantial benefit 
16 conferred, there should still be fees paid. 
17 And, by the way, in the Baker -- or Barker case 
18 referred to by both sides -- several points in our briefs 
19 and here again being argued, the court obviously understood 
20 that common fund cases were recognized in Utah, so a 
21 departure from the so-called American rule noted that it had 
22 been done before. And then it refers to this Cabrera case. 
23 This is found on page 708 of -- of the opinion, 970 P2d 708. 
24 Let's see, they talk about affirming the notion that, "in 
25 common fund cases, to avoid the unjust enrichment of those 
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1 who benefit from the fund that is created by litigation and 
2 who, otherwise, would bear none of the litigation costs." 
3 That's the whole process, and it's similar to class action. 
4 I mean, derivative actions are very similar to class actions 
5 in many respects, and that's the reason that the American 
6 rule has been abrogated in both class action cases and 
7 derivative action. 
8 But what they came to discover early on -- and 
9 it's highlighted by the Mills case in 1970, the U.S. Supreme 
10 Court says it doesn't necessarily have to be money we're 
11 talking about. It could be a fundamental right to some 
12 corporate involvement, for example. Or a fundamental right 
13 to assume that the organization you're a member of is going 
14 to comply with state statute, as is the case here. 
15 But the court in Barker goes on to note that 
16 Cabrera was a fee-shifting case where the opposition, as 
17 opposed to the beneficiaries of the fund, paid the attorneys 
18 fees. I mean, that's what we're talking about here, a fee-
19 shifting case. We're talking about a case in which 
20 substantial benefit's conferred, that fee needs to be paid 
21 out of the -- out of the -- or by the parties to whom the 
22 benefit was conferred upon. And that, in this case, is the 
23 entity the home owners association. 
24 And so that is a preliminary inquiry. There's no 
25 question that that's a preliminary inquiry, but we've dealt 
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with it in cases. And their own memorandum, at page 11, 
says this -- this is their own memorandum: 
"While Barker involved a common fund situation, 
defendant -- I mean -- I'm sorry, that's my language. Their 
language is: 
"Courts that have adopted the substantial benefit 
doctrine, we have, no longer insist that the benefit 
conferred on the class be pecuniary." 
Thau's their memorandum. And so they've --
they've acknowledged --
THE COURT: When the benefit is not money, 
pecuniary, as you say, and in fact the benefitted -- the 
allegedly benefitted parties are now going to have to, in a 
sense, cough up the money from that same entity to pay the 
fees, can the court ever, or should the court weigh the 
benefit against the detriment? I mean, this is going to 
increase the cost of this home owners' participation 
significantly. So do I get to weigh? To find out whether 
there's really a benefit, a net benefit, I guess you'd say. 
MR. SHEEN: Yes. I'd have to say you do. You do 
get to weigh that. And in the mix, I think you've got to 
take the language from the Court of Appeals very seriously. 
All the way through this litigation we tried, at every turn, 
to forestall this -- this expensive solution to the problem. 
Demand was made before I got involved, written demand was 
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1 made before I got involved. Written requests for 
2 discussions were made. Demand was made after I got involved 
3 on the Association. The Association simply stonewalled from 
4 the very beginning. There were no attempts at settlement. 
5 The arbitration that was attempted, or the mediation that 
6 was required by the Court of Appeals was completely 
7 unsuccessful and no fruit of any kind -- the day-long event 
8 was simply just discarded by the parties. And we've never 
9 been able to obtain any other result than by this process of 
10 continued litigation. 
11 Well, at the end of the day, the rights of all of 
12 the members of the Association have been vindicated, and we 
13 also know for a fact that, as a result of the Court of 
14 Appeals opinion, the CC&Rs have been struck down. 
15 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
16 MR. SHEEN: The offending CC&Rs. Now, that is a 
17 blight on every home owner's home and property in that 
18 association. Those restrictions have been removed. The 
19 ability, for example, of the trustees to act with more --
20 with less control by the members has been rescinded and 
21 we're back to the 1972 CC&Rs. 
22 And so there are two substantial benefits 
23 conferred on all of the members of the association, and it 
24 is inappropriate to require these parties, the plaintiffs, 





1 have conferred this benefit. Therefore, we ask that the 
2 motion be denied. 
3 THE COURT: Thank you. 
4 Rebuttal? 
5 MR. BELNAP: May I briefly speak to --
6 THE COURT: Certainly. 
7 MR. BELNAP: Your Honor, the Court of Appeals --
8 well, let me start back here, first of all. I have my copy 
9 of the pleading, Judge, but I would reference the Court to 
10 an order that Judge Brian signed March 3, 1999. 
THE COURT: March '99? 
MR. BELNAP: And I can show you my copy if it 
would be faster. 
14 I THE COURT: Yeah. Maybe it would. I have the 
15 file from '98 through the present, but I'm not turning right 
16 to that. So come on up. Yeah, I'm missing it so far. 
17 MR. BELNAP: This was a hearing that was had 
18 before Judge Brian on a motion to reconsider, and also we 
19 had tendered at the same time a Rule 54(b) certification. 
20 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
21 MR. BELNAP: And Judge Brian went through his 
22 analysis on why the reconsideration was not proper. And 
23 then the following was said: 
24 "Based upon the arguments of counsel, the 
25 agreement of counsel and this Court's review of the matter, 
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1 it's determined by this Court, and this Court so finds, that 
2 there's no just reason for delay and the order of The 
3 Honorable Ronald E. Nehring is hereby certified, pursuant to 
4 Rule 54(b), for entry as a final order and judgment. 
5 "It's the opinion of this Court, and counsel have 
6 also represented to this Court that it was the opinion of 
7 Judge Nehring, that it would be prudent to certify this 
8 order pursuant to Rule 54(b), since the ruling on a summary 
9 judgment substantially resolves the determinative issues in 
10 the above action. And if plaintiff chooses to appeal from 
11 the same, it would be a substantial savings of judicial 
12 resources to have that appeal proceed now rather than 
13 proceeding through a trial and a subsequent appeal." 
14 Now, Judge, we have never waived the standing 
15 issue. 
16 THE COURT: It wasn't addressed at all on appeal? 
17 MR. BELNAP: It was not. And the Court of Appeals 
18 only dealt with the issue of whether the mail-in ballot 
19 procedure was proper or not. And, yes, we'll agree, that 
20 was the guts of the case, just as the order indicated. And 
21 depending on how that ended up resolved, the guts of the 
22 case is -- is gone or is still in there, we agree. But we 
23 have never waived the other issues, and that's why I asked 
24 the plaintiffs at the start of this, "Are you proceeding on 
25 any other claims?" Now, that doesn't preclude us from the 
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1 threshold requirements we deem they have in showing legal 
2 entitlement. They had that burden; it is not ours. 
3 That's the first issue I wanted to address. The 
4 second issue is the Court of Appeals decision did not 
5 determine substantial benefit. They simply indicated that 
6 protecting the rights of members is for their benefit. 
7 There was never a statement, never an issue before the court 
8 about substantial benefit. That did not go up on appeal and 
9 was not before them. 
10 The case of WalMart was cited to the Court. Your 
11 Honor, I realize you -- you haven't had an opportunity as we 
12 have to read all these cases that we've briefed, but there 
13 is a significant difference in both the policy 
14 considerations that the cases take and the caselaw between 
15 for-profit and not-for-profit corporations, such as home 
16 owners associations. And WalMart was a for-profit case. 
17 And you know what the caselaw deals with when you're talking 
18 about minority shareholders in for-profit corporations. 
19 They are given certain rights, and that's not an issue in 
20 a -- in a not-for-profit corporation. 
21 Mr. Sheen then cited the Court to the Cabrera case 
22 that's referenced in the Barker case. And he called it a 
23 fee-shifting case. It was. If you look at the fee-shifting 
24 cases, they are cases where a county employee or a state 





1 government and they've refused to pay them. That is called 
2 fee shifting by our court. It has nothing to do with this 
3 issue, Your Honor, and that's what Cabrera was, 
4 I go back to the issue of equitable power that 
5 this Court has. And I started there early this afternoon. 
6 In the case that I quoted from, Your Honor, the reason that 
7 our Supreme Court has indicated that there are some 
8 exceptions to the American rule is that there are inherent 
g J equitable powers. And if you're going to do equity, you 
have to weigh the benefits versus the detriment. And it's 
their burden of going forward, it's their burden of proof. 
Both of those burdens have not been met and there's a void 
13 I and, therefore, the motion should be granted. 
14 I THE COURT: I think it's obvious, one, that I need 
to read the cases; two, that a lot of issues so far have 
been raised today that perhaps weren't fully anticipated. 
17 I But regardless, this is not something I can decide from the 
18 bench. I need to take your motion under advisement, and I'm 
19 J doing so. That probably still means you need to protect 
your record or create your record in terms of 
reasonableness. 
22 I MR. BELNAP: Okay. 
23 THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead and call your witness 
24 j or make your proffer, however you wish. And when I say 







IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




JO ANN VINCENT, et al, Civil No. 970300011 
Defendants. Judge Robert K. Hilder 
This matter is before the court for final determination of the attorney's fees issue, and 
also consideration of the parties' respective proposed Orders re: Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Plaintiffs' proposed Order was signed August 17, 2001, but the court accepts defendants' 
position that the Utah Court of Appeals decision does not require abrogation of all decisions and 
actions taken by the Association, but only those taken in reliance on the improperly amended 
CC&Rs. Accordingly, the court this day modifies the signed Order to make the distinction 
identified by defendants explicit. A copy of the modified Order is provided to counsel along 
with this Ruling. 
At the court's direction, counsel submitted written closing arguments regarding the 
attorney's fees issue (including the threshold standing issue), following the evidentiary hearing 
on September 19, 2001. Now, having considered the evidence and the arguments, and being 
fully advised, the court rules as follows: 
First, as to standing, the court determines that whether plaintiffs' had standing to bring 
this derivative action (as proper representatives of the class under Rule 23.1, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure), was effectively, if not expressly, decided by Judge Nehring, when he opined that 
there were insufficient facts to determine, on summary judgment, that plaintiffs "are 
inappropriate parties to bring this action." Judge Nehring did not then defer the matter for an 
evidentiary hearing. Instead, he decided the matter, albeit adversely to plaintiffs, on the merits. 
The next time the standing issue could have been addressed was on appeal. The record, 
however, reflects, that neither party briefed the issue for the Court of Appeals. This court cannot 
say whether the appellate court considered the issue sua sponte, but the court can read from the 
decision that no ruling was entered regarding standing. What did happen was that the Court of 
Appeals reached the merits, which they could not have done had they considered that plaintiffs 
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are inappropriate parties. Thus, acceptance of plaintiffs' standing to bring the action is implicit 
in the court's decision. 
While the court believes the foregoing reasoning is dispositive of the standing issue, 
defendants' failure to raise the issue at the Court of Appeals, or to file an appropriate motion on 
remand, both support a conclusion that defendants did, in fact, waive the standing issue. 
The remaining issue is the fee award itself. The court agrees that plaintiffs must satisfy 
the substantial benefit test to receive fees, but once it is shown that the Association was required 
to change its practices, and that certain rights of the Association members, as asserted by 
plaintiffs, were vindicated, the court cannot say that a substantial benefit was not conferred. The 
extent of the benefit is potentially far-reaching, and for the court to engage in excessive 
assessment of the quality of the benefit would likely discourage similarly situated plaintiffs from 
taking aggressive action for fear of the financial burden if a court found that some, but not 
enough, benefit was conferred in a particular case. Accordingly, the court finds that the 
substantial benefit requirement is met in this case. 
The final issue is reasonableness of the fee itself. It is substantial, and payment of the 
requested some will tax the homeowners significantly. Out of concern for those who will bear 
the cost, the court could be tempted to second guess the total and pare specific entries, but that is 
not the standard by which fee awards are measured. Also, a line by line critique ignores the 
reality is that the case must be viewed as a whole. This matter wras bitterly contested. Nothing 
was conceded on either side. Mr. Blakesly may be correct that both sides "over-lawyered" the 
case, but that is an easy criticism, and the most persuasive evidence that plaintiffs did what was 
necessary7 is the fees of defendants, which are very similar to plaintiffs. The court finds that the 
rates charged are reasonable in all instances, but that there is nothing in the difficulty of this case 
or in the result that justifies the premium, orlodestar multiplier, requested by plaintiffs' counsel. 
In summary, the case was an expensive undertaking for both sides and the lessons 
learned, if any, were purchased at a substantial price, but the court cannot find that plaintiffs' fees 
are neither necessary nor reasonable. Accordingly, plaintiffs are awarded their attorney's fees of 
$39,174.00, and costs of $2,153.15, for a total award of $41,327.15. Counsel for plaintiffs shall 
prepare an appropriate Order that is consistent with this Ruling. 
DATED this 27th day of November, 2001. 
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APPENDIX H 
E.Jay Sheen (No. 3749), of 
ROBINSON & SHEEN, L.L.C. 
1366 East Murray-Holladay Road 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone (801) 273-0855 
Attomeys for Jean LeVanger and Rebecca I«. Vanger 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JEAN LEVANGER and REBECCA 
LEVANGER, : ORDER: ATTORNEYS 
: FEES AND COSTS 
Plaintiffs, : 
v. : 
JOANN VINCENT, KEN FISHER, DIANE : 
DUPLANTY, RON DUPLANTY, JAN : 
NEMCIK, BECKY NELSON, ROSIE : 
PETRONELLA, CORY ALSBERG, 
GERALD VINCENT, SANDY FISHER, : 
SCOTT FEATHERSTONE, MARTIN : 
ROGUSCHKA, LANCE SWEDISH : 
LAUREL KANGAS, JOHN DOES 1-5, : 
JANE DOES 1-5, and HIGHLAND : 
ESTATES PROPERTIES OWNERS : 
ASSOCIATION, INC. : Civil No. 97-0300011 
Defendants. : Judge Robert K. Hilder 
An evidentiary hearing on plaintiffs' motion to award attorneys' fees, as part of their 
motion for summary judgment, was held September 19,2001. Based on the evidence presented 
and arguments of counsel, 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Plaintiffs have standing to pursue this matter and to seek their attorneys fees and 
costs from defendant Highland Estates Properties Owners Association, Inc., as derivative 
plaintiffs under Rule 23.1 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2. Plaintiffs have conferred a substantial benefit on members of the Highland Estates 
Properies Owners Association who are similarly situated. 
3. Plaintiffs are awarded attorneys' fees of $39,174.00 and costs of $2,153.15, for a 
total award of $41,327.15, to be paid by The Highland Estates Properties Owners Association, 
Inc. 
Dated: /J* tfC&UUMS ,2001. 
BYTHEC0UKT: .u'.«i'..<,.,., 
Judge; 
Third District Court Judge 
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